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Abstract
The notion of aggregate signature has been motivated by applications and it enables any user to
compress different signatures signed by different signers on different messages into a short signature.
Sequential aggregate signature, in turn, is a special kind of aggregate signature that only allows a signer
to add his signature into an aggregate signature in sequential order. This latter scheme has applications
in diversified settings such as in reducing bandwidth of certificate chains and in secure routing protocols.
Lu, Ostrovsky, Sahai, Shacham, and Waters (EUROCRYPT 2006) presented the first sequential aggre-
gate signature scheme in the standard model. The size of their public key, however, is quite large (i.e.,
the number of group elements is proportional to the security parameter), and therefore, they suggested
as an open problem the construction of such a scheme with short keys.
In this paper, we propose the first sequential aggregate signature schemes with short public keys
(i.e., a constant number of group elements) in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups that are secure
under static assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, our schemes employ a constant number
of pairing operations per message signing and message verification operation. Technically, we start
with a public-key signature scheme based on the recent dual system encryption technique of Lewko and
Waters (TCC 2010). This technique cannot directly provide an aggregate signature scheme since, as we
observed, additional elements should be published in a public key to support aggregation. Thus, our
constructions are careful augmentation techniques for the dual system technique to allow it to support
sequential aggregate signature schemes. We also propose a multi-signature scheme with short public
parameters in the standard model.
Keywords: Public-key signature, Aggregate signature, Sequential aggregate signature, Dual system encryp-
tion, Bilinear maps.
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1 Introduction
Aggregate signature is a relatively new type of public-key signature (PKS) that enables any user to combine
n signatures signed by n different signers on n different messages into a short signature. The concept of
public-key aggregate signature (PKAS) was introduced by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham [10], and
they proposed an efficient PKAS scheme in the random oracle model using bilinear groups. After that,
numerous PKAS schemes were proposed using bilinear groups [1, 7, 8, 15, 16, 27, 28] or using trapdoor
permutations [3, 29, 31].
One application of aggregate signature is the certificate chains of the public-key infrastructure (PKI)
[10]. The PKI system has a tree structure, and a certificate for a user consists of a certificate chain from a root
node to a leaf node, each node in the chain signing its predecessor. If the signatures in the certificate chain
are replaced with a single aggregate signature, then bandwidth for signature transfer can be significantly
saved. Another application is to the secure routing protocol of the Internet protocol [10]. If each router that
participates in the routing protocol uses a PKAS scheme instead of a PKS scheme, then the communication
overload of signature transfer can be dramatically reduced. Furthermore, aggregate signatures have other
applications such as reducing bandwidth in sensor networks or ad-hoc networks, as well as in software
authentication in the presence of software update [1].
1.1 Previous Methods
Aggregate signature schemes are categorized as full aggregate signature, synchronized aggregate signature,
and sequential aggregate signature depending on the type of signature aggregation. They have also been
applied to regular signatures in the PKI model and to ID-based signatures (with a trusted key server).
The first type of aggregate signature is full aggregate signature, which enables any user to freely ag-
gregate different signatures of different signers. This full aggregate signature is the most flexible aggregate
signature since it does not require any restriction on the aggregation step (though restriction may be needed
at times for certain applications). However, there is only one full aggregate signature scheme, proposed by
Boneh et al. [10]1. Since this scheme is based on the short signature scheme of Boneh et al. [11], the sig-
nature length it provides is also very short. However, the security of the scheme has just been proven in the
idealized random oracle model and the number of pairing operations in the aggregate signature verification
algorithm is proportional to the number of signers in the aggregate signature.
The second type of aggregate signature is synchronized aggregate signature, which enables any user to
combine different signatures with the same synchronizing information into a single signature. The synchro-
nized aggregate signature has one drawback: all signers should share the same synchronizing information
(such as a time clock or another shared value). Gentry and Ramzan [15] introduced the concept of syn-
chronized aggregate signature. They proposed an identity-based synchronized aggregate signature scheme
using bilinear groups, and they proved its security in the random oracle model. We note that identity-based
aggregate signature (IBAS) is an ID-based scheme and thus relies on a trusted server knowing all private
keys (i.e., its trust structure is different from that in regular PKI). However, it also has a notable advantage
in that it is not required to retrieve the public keys of signers in the verification algorithm since an identity
string plays the role of a public key (this lack of public key is indicated in our comparison table as public
key of no size!). Recently, Ahn et al. [1] presented a public-key synchronized aggregate signature scheme
without relying on random oracles.
1Subsequent to our work, Hohenberger et al. [19] proposed an identity-based aggregate signature scheme that supports full
aggregation based on the recently introduced candidate multilinear maps of Garg et al. [14].
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The third type of aggregate signature is sequential aggregate signature (SAS), which enables each signer
to aggregate his signature to a previously aggregated signature in a sequential order. The sequential aggre-
gate signature has the obvious limitation of signers being ordered to aggregate their signatures in contrast
to the full aggregate signature and the synchronized aggregate signature. However, it has an advantage in
that it is not required to share synchronized information among signers in contrast to the synchronized ag-
gregate signature, and many natural applications lead themselves to this setting. The concept of sequential
aggregate signature was introduced by Lysyanskaya, Micali, Reyzin, and Shacham [29], and they proposed
a public-key sequential aggregate signature scheme using the certified trapdoor permutations in the random
oracle model. Boldyreva et al. [7] presented an identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme in
the random oracle model using an interactive assumption, but it was shown by Hwang et al. [20] that their
construction is not secure. After that, Boldyreva et al. [8] proposed a new identity-based sequential aggre-
gate signature by modifying their previous construction and proved its security in the generic group model.
Recently, Gerbush et al. [16] showed that the modified IBAS scheme of Boldyreva et al. [8] is secure under
static assumptions using the dual form signatures framework.
The first sequential aggregate signature scheme without random oracle idealization was proposed by
Lu et al. [27, 28]. They converted the PKS scheme of Waters [34] to the PKAS scheme and proved its
security under the well known CDH assumption. However, their scheme has a drawback since the number
of group elements in a public key is proportional to the security parameter (for a security of 280 they need
160 elements, or about 80 elements in a larger group); so they left as an open question how to design
a scheme with shorter public keys. Schro¨der proposed a PKAS scheme with short public keys relying
on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [33]; however the scheme’s security is proven under an
interactive assumption (which, typically, is a relaxation used when designs based on static assumptions are
hard to find).2 Therefore, the construction of an SAS scheme with short public keys without relaxations
such as random oracles or interactive assumptions was left as an open question.
1.2 Our Contributions
Challenged by the above question, the motivation of our research is to construct an efficient SAS scheme
secure in the standard model (i.e., without employing assumptions such as random oracle or interactive
assumptions as part of the proof) with short public keys (e.g., a constant number of group elements). To
achieve this goal, we use the PKS scheme derived from the identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, which
adopts the innovative dual system encryption techniques of Waters [26, 35]. That is, an IBE scheme is first
converted to a PKS scheme by the clever observation of Naor [9]. The PKS schemes that adopt the dual
system encryption techniques are the scheme of Waters [35], which includes a random tag in a signature, and
the scheme of Lewko and Waters [26], which does not include a random tag in a signature. The scheme of
Waters is not appropriate to aggregate signatures since the random tags in signatures cannot be compressed
into a single value. The scheme of Lewko and Waters in composite order groups is easily converted to
an aggregate signature scheme if an element in Gp3 is moved from a private key to a public key, but it is
inefficient because of composite order groups.3
2Gerbush et al. [16] showed that a modified Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in composite order groups is secure
under static assumptions. However, it is unclear whether the construction of Schro¨der can be directly applied to this modified
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme. The reason is that aggregating Gp1 and Gp2 subgroups is hard and a private key
element g2,3 ∈ Gp2 p3 cannot be generated by the key generation algorithm of an aggregate signature scheme. Additionally, our
work and findings are independent of the work of Gerbush et al.
3We can safely move the element in Gp3 from a private key to a public key since it is always given in assumptions. Lewko
obtained a prime order IBE scheme by translating the Lewko-Waters composite order IBE scheme using the dual pairing vector
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Table 1: Comparison of aggregate signature schemes
Scheme Type ROM KOSK PK Size AS Size Sign Time Verify Time Assumption
BGLS [10] Full Yes No 1kp 1kp 1E lP CDH
GR [15] IB, Sync Yes No – 2kp +λ 3E 3P + lE CDH
AGH [1] Sync Yes Yes 1kp 2kp + 32 6E 4P + lE CDH
AGH [1] Sync No Yes 1kp 2kp + 32 10E 8P + lE CDH
LMRS [29] Seq Yes No 1k f 1k f lE lE cert TDP
Neven [31] Seq Yes No 1k f 1k f + 2λ 1E + 2lM 2lM uncert CFP
BGOY [8] IB, Seq Yes No – 3kp 4P + lE 4P + lE Interactive
GLOW [16] IB, Seq Yes No – 5k f 10P + 2lE 10P + 2lE Static
LOSSW [27] Seq No Yes 2λ kp 2kp 2P + 4λ lM 2P + 2λ lM CDH
Schro¨der [33] Seq No Yes 2kp 4kp lP + 2lE lP + lE Interactive
Ours Seq No Yes 11kp 8kp 8P + 5lE 8P + 4lE Static
Ours Seq No Yes 13kp 6kp 6P + 6lE 6P + 3lE Static
ROM = random oracle model, KOSK = certified-key model, IB = identity based
λ = security parameter, kp,k f = the bit size of elements for pairing and factoring, l = the number of signers
P = pairing computation, E = exponentiation, M = multiplication
Therefore, we start the construction from the IBE scheme of Lewko and Waters (LW-IBE) [26] in the
prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups. However, this LW-PKS scheme, which is directly derived from
the LW-IBE scheme, is not easily converted to an SAS scheme (as far as we see). The reason is that we
need a PKS scheme that supports multi-users and public re-randomization to construct an SAS scheme by
using the randomness reuse technique of Lu et al. [27], but the LW-PKS scheme does not support these
two properties. Technically speaking, this directly converted LW-PKS scheme does not support multi-
users and public re-randomization since group elements g,u,h ∈ G cannot be published in a public key.
To resolve this problem, we devised two independent solutions. Our first solution for this problem is to
randomize the verification algorithm of the LW-PKS scheme and publish g,u,h ∈G in the public key. That
is, the verification components are additionally multiplied by vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi to prevent the verification of invalid
signatures. Our second solution for this problem is to randomize the group elements of the public key. That
it, we publish gwcg1 ,uw
cu
1 ,hw
ch
1 ∈G in the public key instead of g,u,h ∈G.
Here we first construct two PKS schemes in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups that support multi-
users and public re-randomization by applying our two solutions to the LW-PKS scheme, and we prove their
security by using the dual system encryption technique. Next, we convert the modified PKS schemes to SAS
schemes with short public keys by using the randomness reuse technique, and then we prove their security
based on the traditional static assumptions without random oracles. Additionally, we present an efficient
multi-signature scheme based on our modified PKS scheme. Table 1 gives the comparison of past aggregate
signature schemes with ours.
spaces [25]. One may consider to construct an aggregate signature scheme using this IBE scheme. However, it is not easy to
aggregate individual signatures since the dual orthonormal basis vectors of each users are randomly generated.
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1.3 Additional Related Work
There are some works on aggregate signature schemes that allow signers to communicate with each other
or schemes that compress only partial elements of a signature in the aggregate algorithm [2, 4, 12, 18].
Generally, communication resources of computer systems are very expensive compared with computation
resources. Thus, it is preferred to perform several expensive computational operations rather than one single
communication exchange. Additionally, a signature scheme with added communications does not corre-
spond to a pure PKS scheme, but corresponds more to a multi-party protocol. In addition, PKS schemes
that compress just partial elements of signatures cannot be considered aggregate signature schemes since
the total size of signatures is still proportional to the number of signers.
Another research area related to aggregate signature is multi-signature [6, 21, 27]. Multi-signature is
a special type of aggregate signature in which all signers generate signatures on the same message, and
then any user can combine these signatures into a single signature. Aggregate message authentication code
(AMAC) is the symmetric key analogue of aggregate signature: Katz and Lindell [22] introduced the concept
of AMAC and showed that it is possible to construct an AMAC scheme based on any message authentication
code scheme.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we define asymmetric bilinear groups and introduce the complexity assumptions for our
schemes. The description of LW-IBE and LW-PKS schemes is given in Appendix A.
2.1 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
Let G, ˆG and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g and gˆ be generators of G and ˆG,
respectively. The bilinear map e : G× ˆG→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈G,∀vˆ ∈ ˆG and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vˆb) = e(u, vˆ)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, gˆ) 6= 1, that is, e(g, gˆ) is a generator of GT .
We say that G, ˆG,GT are bilinear groups with no efficiently computable isomorphisms if the group opera-
tions in G, ˆG, and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable, but there are no efficiently
computable isomorphisms between G and ˆG.
2.2 Complexity Assumptions
We employ four assumptions in prime order bilinear groups. The SXDH and DBDH assumptions have been
used extensively, while the LW1 and LW2 assumptions were introduced by Lewko and Waters [26].
Assumption 2.1 (Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman, SXDH). Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the
asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is
that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb) and T,
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gˆab from T = T1 = gˆc with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvSXDHB (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where
the probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c ∈ Zp.
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Assumption 2.2 (LW1). Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime
order p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is that if
the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,gb, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb, gˆab
2
, gˆb
2
, gˆb
3
, gˆc, gˆac, gˆbc, gˆb
2c, gˆb
3c) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gˆab
2c from T = T1 = gˆd with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvLW1B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 2.3 (LW2). Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime
order p. Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,ga,gb,gc, gˆ, gˆa, gˆa
2
, gˆbx, gˆabx, gˆa
2x) and T,
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gbc from T = T1 = gd with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvLW2B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,x,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 2.4 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, DBDH). Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the
asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is
that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,ga,gb,gc, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb, gˆc) and T,
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = e(g, gˆ)abc from T = T1 = e(g, gˆ)d with more than a
negligible advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvDBDHB (λ )=
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0)= 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp.
The LW1 and LW2 assumptions are falsifiable since they are not interactive (or even q-type) assumptions
and they obviously hold in the generic bilinear group model since the target polynomial in T is independent
of given polynomials in D.
3 Public-Key Signature
In this section, we propose two PKS schemes with short public keys and prove their security under static
assumptions.
3.1 Definitions
The concept of PKS was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [13]. In PKS, a signer first generates a public
key and a private key, and then he publishes the public key. The signer generates a signature on a message
by using his private key. A verifier can check the validity of the signer’s signature on the message by using
the signer’s public key. A PKS scheme is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Public-Key Signature). A public key signature (PKS) scheme consists of three PPT algo-
rithms KeyGen, Sign, and Verify, which are defined as follows:
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KeyGen(1λ ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameters 1λ and outputs a public
key PK and a private key SK.
Sign(M,SK). The signing algorithm takes as input a message M and a private key SK and outputs a
signature σ .
Verify(σ ,M,PK). The verification algorithm takes as input a signature σ , a message M, and a public key
PK and outputs either 1 or 0, depending on the validity of the signature.
The correctness requirement is that for any (PK,SK) output by KeyGen and any M ∈M, we have Verify
(Sign(M,SK),M,PK) = 1. We can relax this notion to require that the verification is correct with over-
whelming probability over all the randomness of the experiment.
The security model of PKS is defined as existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack (EUF-
CMA), and this was formally defined by Goldwasser et al. [17]. In this security model, an adversary adap-
tively requests a polynomial number of signatures on messages through the signing oracle, and he finally
outputs a forged signature on a message M∗. If the message M∗ was not queried to the signing oracle and
the forged signature is valid, then the adversary wins this game. The security of PKS is formally defined as
follows:
Definition 3.2 (Security). The security notion of existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack
is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C first generates a key pair (PK,SK) by running KeyGen, and gives PK to A.
2. Signature Query: Then A, adaptively and polynomially many times, requests a signature query on
a message M under the challenge public key PK, and receives a signature σ generated by running
Sign.
3. Output: Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ on a message M∗. C then outputs 1 if the forged
signature satisfies the following two conditions, or outputs 0 otherwise: 1) Verify(σ ∗,M∗,PK) = 1
and 2) M∗ was not queried by A to the signing oracle.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvPKSA (λ ) = Pr[C = 1] where the probability is taken over all the ran-
domness of the experiment. A PKS scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if all
PPT adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above experiment (for a large enough security
parameter).
3.2 Construction
We construct PKS schemes with a short public key that will be augmented to support multi-users and public
re-randomization. To construct a PKS scheme with a short public key, we may convert the LW-IBE scheme
[26] in prime order groups to the LW-PKS scheme in prime order groups by using the transformation of
Naor [9]. However, this directly converted LW-PKS scheme does not support multi-users and public re-
randomization since it is necessary to publish additional public key components: Specifically, we need to
publish an element g for multi-users and elements g,u,h for public re-randomization. Note that gˆ, uˆ, ˆh are
already in the public key, but g,u,h are not. One may try to publish g,u,h in the public key, but a technical
difficulty arises in this case in that the simulator of the security proof can easily distinguish from the normal
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verification algorithm to the semi-functional one, without using an adversary. Thus the simulator of Lewko
and Waters sets the CDH value into the elements g,u,h to prevent the simulator from creating these elements.
To solve this problem, we devise two independent solutions. The first solution allows a PKS scheme
to safely publish elements g,u,h in the public key for multi-users and public re-randomization. The main
idea is to additionally randomize the verification components using vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi in the verification algorithm.
If a valid signature is given in the verification algorithm, then the additionally added randomization ele-
ments vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi are canceled. Otherwise, the added randomization components prevent the verification of
an invalid signature. Therefore, the simulator of the security proof cannot detect the changes of the verifi-
cation algorithm even if g,u,h are published, since the additional elements vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi prevent the signature
verification.
Our second solution for this problem is to publish randomized components gwcg1 ,uw
cu
1 ,hw
ch
1 that are ad-
ditionally multiplied with random elements rather than directly publishing g,u,h. In this case, the simulator
can create these elements since the random exponents cg,cu,ch can be used to cancel out the CDH value
embedded in the elements g,u,h. Additionally, the simulator cannot detect the changes of verification com-
ponents for the forged signature because of the added elements wcg1 ,w
cu
1 ,w
ch
1 . This solution does not increase
the number of group elements in the signatures, rather it increases the number of public keys since additional
elements wcg2 ,wcg ,w
cu
2 ,w
cu ,wch2 ,w
ch should be published.
3.2.1 Our PKS1 Scheme
Our first PKS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
PKS1.KeyGen(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈G and gˆ, vˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it chooses random exponents
ν1,ν2,ν3,φ1,φ2,φ3 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + ν1φ2 + ν2φ3,pi = φ2 + ν3φ3. It selects random exponents
α ,x,y ∈ Zp and sets u = gx,h = gy, uˆ = gˆx, ˆh = gˆy,w1 = wφ1,w2 = wφ2,w3 = wφ3 . It outputs a private
key SK = α and a public key as
PK =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), g,u,h, w1,w2,w3,w, gˆ, gˆν1 , gˆν2 , gˆ−τ ,
uˆ, uˆν1 , uˆν2 , uˆ−τ , ˆh, ˆhν1 , ˆhν2 , ˆh−τ , vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
PKS1.Sign(M,SK): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0,1}k where k < λ and a private key
SK = α . It selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp and outputs a signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 ,W1,2 = w
c1
2 ,W1,3 = w
c1
3 ,W1,4 = w
c1 ,
W2,1 = grwc21 ,W2,2 = w
c2
2 ,W2,3 = w
c2
3 ,W2,4 = w
c2
)
.
PKS1.Verify(σ ,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0,1}k under a
public key PK. It first chooses random exponents t,s1,s2 ∈ Zp and computes verification components
as
V1,1 = gˆt ,V1,2 = (gˆν1)t vˆs1 ,V1,3 = (gˆν2)t(vˆν3)s1 ,V1,4 = (gˆ−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s1 ,
V2,1 = (uˆM ˆh)t ,V2,2 = ((uˆν1)M ˆhν1)t vˆs2 ,V2,3 = ((uˆν2)M ˆhν2)t(vˆν3)s2 ,V2,4 = ((uˆ−τ )M ˆh−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s2 .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
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We note that the inner product of (φ1,φ2,φ3,1) and (1,ν1,ν2,−τ) is zero since τ = φ1 + ν1φ2 + ν2φ3,
and the inner product of (φ1,φ2,φ3,1) and (0,1,ν3,−pi) is zero since pi = φ2 +ν3φ3. Using these facts, the
correctness of PKS is easily obtained from the equation
4
∏
i=1
e(W1,i,V1,i) ·
4
∏
i=1
e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 = e(gα(uMh)r, gˆt) · e(gr,(uˆM ˆh)t)−1 = Ωt .
3.2.2 Our PKS2 Scheme
Our second PKS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
PKS2.KeyGen(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p
of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈ G and gˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it selects random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈Zp and sets τ = φ1+νφ2. It also selects random exponents α ,x,y ∈ Zp and sets u = gx,h =
gy, uˆ = gˆx, ˆh = gˆy,w1 = wφ1,w2 = wφ2 . It outputs a private key SK = (α ,g,u,h) and a public key by
selecting random values cg,cu,ch ∈ Zp as
PK =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), gw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg , uwcu1 ,w
cu
2 ,w
cu , hwch1 ,w
ch
2 ,w
ch ,
w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ , uˆ, uˆν , uˆ−τ , ˆh, ˆhν , ˆh−τ , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
PKS2.Sign(M,SK): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ Zp and a private key SK = (α ,g,u,h)
with PK. It selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp and outputs a signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 , W1,2 = w
c1
2 , W1,3 = w
c1 ,
W2,1 = grwc21 , W2,2 = w
c2
2 , W2,3 = w
c2
)
.
PKS2.Verify(σ ,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ Zp under a public
key PK. It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes verification components as
V1,1 = gˆt , V1,2 = (gˆν)t , V1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t ,
V2,1 = (uˆM ˆh)t , V2,2 = ((uˆν )M ˆhν)t , V2,3 = ((uˆ−τ )M ˆh−τ)t .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We note that the inner product of (φ1,φ2,1) and (1,ν ,−τ) is zero since τ = φ1 + νφ2. Using this fact,
the correctness of PKS is easily obtained from the following equation
3
∏
i=1
e(W1,i,V1,i) ·
3
∏
i=1
e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 = e(gα(uMh)r, gˆt) · e(gr,(uˆM ˆh)t)−1 = Ωt .
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3.3 Security Analysis
We prove the security of our PKS schemes without random oracles under static assumptions. To prove
the security, we use the dual system encryption technique of Lewko and Waters [26]. The dual system
encryption technique was originally developed to prove the full-model security of IBE and its extensions, but
it also can be used to prove the security of PKS by using the transformation of Naor [9]. Note that Gerbush
et al. [16] developed the dual form signature technique that is a variation of the dual system encryption
technique to prove the security of their PKS schemes.
3.3.1 Analysis of PKS1
Theorem 3.3. The above PKS1 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the
SXDH, LW2, DBDH assumptions hold. That is, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT algorithms
B1,B2,B3 such that AdvPKSA (λ )≤AdvSXDHB1 (λ )+qAdv
LW2
B2 (λ )+Adv
DBDH
B3 (λ ) where q is the maximum num-
ber of signature queries of A.
Proof. To use the dual system encryption technique of Lewko and Waters [26], we first describe a semi-
functional signing algorithm and a semi-functional verification algorithm. They are not used in a real system;
rather, they are used in the security proof. When comparing our proof to that of Lewko and Waters, we
employ a different assumption since we have published additional elements g,u,h used in aggregation (in
fact, direct adaptation of the earlier technique will break the assumption and thus the proof). A crucial idea
in our proof is that we have added elements vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi in the public key that are used in randomization of the
verification algorithm. In the security proof when moving from normal to semi-functional verification, it is
the randomization elements vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi that are expanded to the semi-functional space; this enables deriving
semi-functional verification as part of the security proof under our assumption, without being affected by
the publication of the additional public key elements used for aggregation.
For the semi-functional signing and verification, we set f = gy f , ˆf = gˆy f where y f is a random exponent
in Zp.
PKS1.SignSF. The semi-functional signing algorithm first creates a normal signature using the private key.
Let (W ′1,1, . . . ,W ′2,4) be the normal signature of a message M with random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp. It
selects random exponents sk,zk ∈ Zp and outputs a semi-functional signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 =W ′1,1( f ν1ν3−ν2)skzk , W1,2 =W ′1,2( f−ν3)skzk , W1,3 =W ′1,3 f skzk , W1,4 =W ′1,4,
W2,1 =W ′2,1( f ν1ν3−ν2)sk , W2,2 =W ′2,2( f−ν3)sk , W2,3 =W ′2,3 f sk , W2,4 =W ′2,4
)
.
PKS1.VerifySF. The semi-functional verification algorithm first creates normal verification components
using the public key. Let (V ′1,1, . . . ,V ′2,4) be the normal verification components with random exponents
t,s1,s2 ∈ Zp. It chooses random exponents sc,zc ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification
components as
V1,1 =V ′1,1, V1,2 =V ′1,2, V1,3 =V ′1,3 ˆf sc , V1,4 =V ′1,4( ˆf−φ3)sc ,
V2,1 =V ′2,1, V2,2 =V ′2,2, V2,3 =V ′2,3 ˆf sczc , V2,4 =V ′2,4( ˆf−φ3)sczc .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
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Note that if the semi-functional verification algorithm verifies a semi-functional signature, then the left part
of the above verification equation contains an additional random element e( f , ˆf )sksc(zk−zc). If zk = zc, then
the semi-functional verification algorithm succeeds. In this case, we say that the signature is nominally
semi-functional.
The security proof uses a sequence of games G0,G1,G2, and G3: The first game G0 will be the original
security game and the last game G3 will be a game such that an adversary A has no advantage. Formally,
the hybrid games are defined as follows:
Game G0. This game is the original security game. In this game, the signatures that are given to A are
normal and the challenger use the normal verification algorithm Verify to check the validity of the
forged signature of A.
Game G1. We first modify the original game to a new game G1. This game is almost identical to G0 except
that the challenger uses the semi-functional verification algorithm VerifySF to check the validity of
the forged signature of A.
Game G2. Next, we change G1 to a new game G2. This game is the same as the G1 except that the
signatures that are given to A will be semi-functional. At this moment, the signatures are semi-
functional and the challenger uses the semi-functional verification algorithm VerifySF to check the
validity of the forged signature. Suppose that A makes at most q signature queries. For the security
proof, we define a sequence of hybrid games G1,0, . . . ,G1,k, . . . ,G1,q where G1,0 = G1. In G1,k, a
normal signature is given to A for all j-th signature queries such that j > k, and a semi-functional
signature is given to A for all j-th signature queries such that j ≤ k. It is obvious that G1,q is equal to
G2.
Game G3. Finally, we define a new game G3. This game differs from G2 in that the challenger always
rejects the forged signature of A. Therefore, the advantage of this game is zero since A cannot win
this game.
For the security proof, we show the indistinguishability of each hybrid game. We informally describe
the meaning of each indistinguishability as follows:
• Indistinguishability of G0 and G1: This property shows that A cannot forge a semi-functional signa-
ture if it is only given normal signatures. That is, if A forges a semi-functional signature, then it can
distinguish G0 from G1.
• Indistinguishability of G1 and G2: This property shows that the probability of A forging a normal
signature is almost the same when the signatures given to the adversary are changed from a normal
type to a semi-functional type. That is, if the probability of A forging a normal signature is different
in G1 and G2, then A can distinguish the two games.
• Indistinguishability of G2 and G3: This property shows that A cannot forge a normal signature if it is
only given semi-functional signatures. That is, if A forges a normal signature, then it can distinguish
G2 from G3.
The security (unforgeability) of our PKS scheme follows from a hybrid argument. We first consider an
adversary A attacking our PKS scheme in the original security game G0. By the indistinguishability of G0
and G1, we have that A can forge a normal signature with a non-negligible ε probability, but it can forge
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a semi-functional signature with only a negligible probability. Now we should show that the ε probability
of A forging a normal signature is also negligible. By the indistinguishability of G1 and G2, we have that
the ε probability of A forging a normal signature is almost the same when the signatures given to A are
changed from a normal type to a semi-functional type. Finally, by the indistinguishability of G2 and G3, we
have that A can forge a normal signature with only a negligible probability. Summing up, we obtain that the
probability of A forging a semi-functional signature is negligible (from the indistinguishability of G0 and
G1) and the probability of A forging a normal signature is also negligible (from the indistinguishability of
G2 and G3).
Let AdvG j
A
be the advantage of A in G j for j = 0, . . . ,3. Let AdvG1,kA be the advantage of A in G1,k
for k = 0, . . . ,q. It is clear that AdvG0
A
= AdvPKSA (λ ), Adv
G1,0
A
= AdvG1
A
, AdvG1,q
A
= AdvG2
A
, and AdvG3
A
= 0.
From the following three Lemmas, we prove that it is hard for A to distinguish Gi−1 from Gi under the given
assumptions. Therefore, we have that
AdvPKSA (λ ) = AdvG0A +
2
∑
i=1
(
AdvGi
A
−AdvGi
A
)
−AdvG3
A
≤
3
∑
i=1
∣∣AdvGi−1
A
−AdvGi
A
∣∣
= AdvSXDHB1 (λ )+
q
∑
k=1
AdvLW2B2 (λ )+Adv
DBDH
B3 (λ ).
This completes our proof.
Lemma 3.4. If the SXDH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
G0 and G1 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B1
such that
∣∣AdvG0
A
−AdvG1
A
∣∣= AdvSXDHB1 (λ ).
Proof. Before proving this lemma, we introduce the parallel-SXDH assumption as follows: Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e)
be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let k, ˆk be generators of G, ˆG respec-
tively. The assumption is stated as following: given a challenge tuple D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k, ˆka, ˆkd1 , ˆkd2)
and T = (A1,A2), it is hard to decide whether T = (ˆkad1 , ˆkad2) or T = (ˆkd3 , ˆkd4) with random choices of
a,d1,d2,d3,d4 ∈ Zp. It is easy to prove by simple hybrid arguments that if there exists an adversary that
breaks the parallel-SXDH assumption, then it can break the SXDH assumption. Alternatively, we can
tightly prove the reduction using the random self-reducibility of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G0 and G1 with non-negligible ad-
vantage. Simulator B1 that solves the parallel-SXDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkd1 , ˆkd2) and T = (A1,A2) where T = T0 = (A01,A02) = (ˆkad1 , ˆkad2) or T =
T1 = (A11,A12) = (ˆkad1+d3 , ˆkad2+d4). Then B1 that interacts with A is described as follows: B1 first chooses
random exponents ν1,ν2,φ1,φ2,φ3 ∈ Zp, then it sets τ = φ1 + ν1φ2 + ν2φ3. It selects random exponents
α ,x,y,yg,yv,yw ∈Zp and sets g = kyg ,u = gx,h = gy,w1 = kywφ1 ,w2 = kywφ2,w3 = kywφ3 ,w = kyw , gˆ = ˆkyg , uˆ =
gˆx, ˆh = gˆy. It implicitly sets ν3 = a,pi = φ2 +aφ3 and publishes a public key PK as
g,u,h, w1,w2,w3,w, gˆ, gˆν1 , gˆν2 , gˆ−τ , uˆ, uˆν1 , uˆν2 , uˆ−τ ,
ˆh, ˆhν1 , ˆhν2 , ˆh−τ , vˆ = ˆkyv , vˆν3 = (ˆka)yv , vˆ−pi = ˆk−yvφ2(ˆka)−yvφ3 , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α .
It sets a private key SK = α . Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and verifi-
cation. A adaptively requests a signature for a message M. To response this sign query, B1 creates a normal
signature by calling PKS1.Sign since it knows the private key. Note that it cannot create a semi-functional
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signature since it does not know ka. Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,4) on a mes-
sage M∗ from A. To verify the forged signature, B1 first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes
verification components by implicitly setting s1 = d1, s2 = d2 as
V1,1 = gˆt , V1,2 = (gˆν1)t(ˆkd1)yv , V1,3 = (gˆν2)t(A1)yv , V1,4 = (gˆ−τ)t(ˆkd1)−yvφ2(A1)−yvφ3,
V2,1 = (uˆM
∗
ˆh)t , V2,2 = ((uˆν1)M
∗
ˆhν1)t(ˆkd2)yv , V2,3 = ((uˆν2)M
∗
ˆhν2)t(A2)yv ,
V2,4 = ((uˆ−τ)M
∗
ˆh−τ)t(ˆkd2)−yvφ2(A2)−yvφ3 .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1
?
= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0.
Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish this proof, we show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the
distribution using D,T0 = (A01,A02) = (ˆkad1 , ˆkad2) is the same as G0. The public key is correctly distributed
since the random blinding values yg,yw,yv are used. The signatures is correctly distributed since it uses the
signing algorithm. The verification components are correctly distributed as
V1,3 = (gˆν2)t(vˆν3)s1 = (gˆν2)t(ˆkyva)d1 = (gˆν2)t(A01)yv ,
V1,4 = (gˆ−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s1 = (gˆ−τ)t(ˆk−yv(φ2+aφ3))d1 = (gˆ−τ)t(ˆkd1)−yvφ2(A01)−yvφ3 ,
V2,3 = ((uˆν2)M
∗
ˆhν2)t(vˆν3)s2 = ((uˆν2)M∗ ˆhν2)t(ˆkyva)d2 = ((uˆν2)M∗ ˆhν2)t(A02)yv
V2,4 = ((uˆ−τ)M
∗
ˆh−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s2 = ((uˆ−τ)M∗ ˆh−τ)t(ˆk−yv(φ2+aφ3))d2
= ((uˆ−τ)M
∗
ˆh−τ)t(ˆkd2)−yvφ2(A02)−yvφ3 .
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = (A11,A12) = (ˆkad1+d3 , ˆkad2+d4) is the same
as G1. We only consider the distribution of the verification components since T is only used in the ver-
ification components. The difference between T0 = (A01,A02) and T1 = (A11,A12) is that T1 = (A11,A12) addi-
tionally has (ˆkd3 , ˆkd4). Thus V1,3,V1,4,V2,3,V2,4 that have T = (A1,A2) in the simulation additionally have
(ˆkd3)yv ,(ˆkd3)−yvφ3 ,(ˆkd4)yv ,(ˆkd4)−yvφ3 respectively. If we implicitly set sc = yvd3, zc = d4/d3, then the ver-
ification components for the forged signature are semi-functional since d3,d4 are randomly chosen. This
completes our proof.
Lemma 3.5. If the LW2 assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G1
and G2 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B2 such
that
∣∣AdvG1,k−1
A
−AdvG1,k
A
∣∣= AdvLW2B2 (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G1,k−1 and G1,k with non-negligible
advantage. A simulator B2 that solves the LW2 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,kb,kc, ˆka, ˆka
2
, ˆkbx, ˆkabx, ˆka2x) and T where T = T0 = kbc or T = T1 = kbc+d . Then B2
that interacts withA is described as follows: B2 first selects random exponents ν1,ν2,ν3,yτ ,pi,A,B,α ,yu,yh,
yw,yv ∈ Zp and sets g = ka,u = (ka)Akyu ,h = (ka)Bkyh ,w = kyw , gˆ = ˆka, uˆ = (ˆka)A ˆkyu , ˆh = (ˆka)B ˆkyh , vˆ = ˆkyv . It
implicitly sets φ1 = (ν1ν3−ν2)b−ν1pi +(a+yτ ),φ2 =−ν3b+pi,φ3 = b,τ = a+yτ and publishes a public
key PK as
g,u,h, w1 = ((kb)ν1ν3−ν2k−ν1pi(ka)kyτ )yw ,w2 = ((kb)−ν3kpi)yw ,w3 = (kb)yw ,w,
gˆ, gˆν1 , gˆν2 , gˆ−τ = (ˆka2(ˆka)yτ )−1), uˆ, uˆν1 , uˆν2 , uˆ−τ = ((ˆka2)A(ˆka)yu+Ayτ ˆkyuyτ )−1,
ˆh, ˆhν1 , ˆhν2 , ˆh−τ = ((ˆka2)B(ˆka)yh+Byτ ˆkyhyτ )−1, vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi , Ω = e(ka, ˆka)α .
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Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and verification. A adaptively requests a
signature for a message M. If this is a j-th signature query, then B2 handles this query as follows:
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional signature by calling PKS1.SignSF since it knows the tuple
( f ν1ν3−ν2, f−ν3 , f ,1) for the semi-functional signature.
• Case j = k : It selects random exponents r′,c′1,c′2 ∈ Zp and creates a signature by implicitly setting
r =−c+ r′, c1 = c(AM+B)/yw + c′1, c2 = c/yw + c′2 as
W1,1 = gα(kc)−(yuM+yh)(uMh)r
′
(T )(ν1ν3−ν2)(AM+B)(kc)(−ν1pi+yτ )(AM+B)wc
′
1
1 ,
W1,2 = (T )−ν3(AM+B)(kc)pi(AM+B)w
c′1
2 , W1,3 = (T )
(AM+B)w
c′1
3 , W1,4 = (k
c)(AM+B)wc
′
1 ,
W2,1 = gr
′
(T )(ν1ν3−ν2)(kc)(−ν1pi+yτ )wc
′
2
1 , W2,2 = (T )
−ν3(kc)ywpiwc
′
2
2 , W2,3 = Tw
c′2
3 , W2,4 = (k
c)ywwc
′
2 .
• Case j > k : It creates a normal signature by calling PKS1.Sign since it knows α of the private key.
Note that x,y are not required.
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,4) on a message M∗. To verify the forged signature,
B2 first chooses random exponents t ′,s1,s2 ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification components by
implicitly setting t = bx+ t ′, sc =−a2x, zc = AM∗+B as
V1,1 = ˆkabx(ˆka)t
′
, V1,2 = (ˆkabx)ν1(ˆka)ν1t
′
vˆs1 ,
V1,3 = (ˆkabx)ν2(ˆka)ν2t
′
vˆν3s1(ˆka2x)−1, V1,4 = (ˆkabx)−yτ (ˆka
2
)−t
′
(ˆka)−yτ t ′ vˆ−pis1 ,
V2,1 = (ˆkabx)AM
∗+B(ˆkbx)yuM∗+yh(uˆM∗ ˆh)t ′ ,
V2,2 = (ˆkabx)(AM
∗+B)ν1(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν1(uˆM∗ ˆh)ν1t ′ vˆs2 ,
V2,3 = (ˆkabx)(AM
∗+B)ν2(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν2(uˆM∗ ˆh)ν2t ′ vˆν3s2(ˆka2x)−(AM∗+B),
V2,4 = (ˆkabx)−(AM
∗+B)yτ−(yuM∗+yh)(ˆkbx)−(yuM∗+yh)yτ (ˆka2)−(AM∗+B)t ′(ˆka)−(yuM∗+yh)t ′(uˆM∗ ˆh)−yτ t ′ vˆ−pis2 .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= e(ka, ˆkabx)α · e(ka, ˆka)αt
′
. If this equation holds,
then it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we should show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show
that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = kbc is the same as G1,k−1. The public key is correctly
distributed since the random blinding values yu,yh,yw,yv are used. The k-th signature is correctly distributed
as
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 = g
α(k(aA+yu)MkaB+yh)−c+r′(kyw((ν1ν3−ν2)b−ν1pi+(a+yτ )))c(AM+B)/yw+c′1
= gα(kc)−(yuM+yh)(uMh)r′(T )(ν1ν3−ν2)(AM+B)(kc)(−ν1pi+yτ )(AM+B)wc
′
1
1 ,
W1,2 = wc12 = (k
yw(−ν3b+pi))c(AM+B)/yw+c
′
1 = (T )−ν3(AM+B)(kc)pi(AM+B)wc
′
1
2 ,
W1,3 = wc13 = (k
ywb)c(AM+B)/yw+c
′
1 = (T )(AM+B)wc
′
1
3 ,
W1,4 = wc1 = (kyw)c(AM+B)/yw+c
′
1 = (kc)(AM+B)wc′1 .
The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
V2,1 = (uˆM
∗
ˆh)t = (ˆk(aA+yu)M∗ ˆkaB+yh)bx+t ′ = (ˆkabx)AM∗+B(ˆkbx)yuM∗+yh(uˆM∗ ˆh)t ′ ,
V2,2 = ((uˆν1)M
∗
ˆhν1)t vˆs2 = (ˆk(aA+yu)ν1M∗ ˆk(aB+yh)ν1)bx+t ′ vˆs2
= (ˆkabx)(AM∗+B)ν1(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν1(uˆM∗ ˆh)ν1t ′ vˆs2 ,
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V2,3 = ((uˆν2)M
∗
ˆhν2)t(vˆν3)s2 ˆf sczc = (ˆk(aA+yu)ν2M∗ ˆk(aB+yh)ν2)bx+t ′(vˆν3)s2 ˆk−a2x(AM∗+B)
= (ˆkabx)(AM∗+B)ν2(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν2(uˆM∗ ˆh)ν2t ′ vˆν3s2(ˆka2x)−(AM∗+B),
V2,4 = ((uˆ−τ)M
∗
ˆh−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s2( ˆf−φ3)sczc
= (ˆk−(aA+yu)(a+yτ )M∗ ˆk−(aB+yh)(a+yτ ))bx+t ′(vˆ−pi)s2 ˆk−b(−a2x)(AM∗+B)
= (ˆkabx)−(AM∗+B)yτ−(yuM∗+yh)(ˆkbx)−(yuM∗+yh)yτ (ˆka2)−(AM∗+B)t ′(ˆka)−(yuM∗+yh)t ′(uˆM∗ ˆh)−yτ t ′ vˆ−pis2 .
The simulator can create the semi-functional verification components with only fixed zc = AM∗+B since
sc,sc enable the cancellation of ˆka
2bx
. Even though the simulator uses the fixed zc, the distribution of zc
is correct since A,B are information theoretically hidden to A. We next show that the distribution of the
simulation using D,T1 = kbc+d is the same as G1,k. We only consider the distribution of the k-th signature
since T is only used in the k-th signature. The only difference between T0 and T1 is that T1 additionally
has kd . The signature components W1,1,W1,2,W1,3, W2,1,W2,2,W2,3 that have T in the simulation additionally
have (kd)(ν1ν3−ν2)(AM+B), (kd)−ν3(AM+B), (kd)(AM+B), (kd)(ν1ν3−ν2), (kd)−ν3,kd respectively. If we implicitly
set sk = d,zk = AM +B, then the distribution of the k-th signature is the same as G1,k except that the k-th
signature is nominally semi-functional.
Finally, we show that the adversary cannot distinguish the nominally semi-functional signature from
the semi-functional signature. The main idea of this is that the adversary cannot request a signature for
the forgery message M∗ in the security model. Suppose there exists an unbounded adversary, then the
adversary can gather zk = AM +B from the k-th signature and zc = AM∗+B from the forged signature. It
is easy to show that zk and zc look random to the unbounded adversary since f (M) = AM+B is a pair-wise
independent function and A,B are information theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our
proof.
Lemma 3.6. If the DBDH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
G2 and G3 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B3
such that
∣∣AdvG2
A
−AdvG3
A
∣∣= AdvDBDHB3 (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguish G2 from G3 with non-negligible advantage. A
simulator B3 that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),
k,ka,kb,kc, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆkc) and T where T = T0 = e(k, ˆk)abc or T = T1 = e(k, ˆk)d . Then B3 that interacts with
A is described as follows: B3 first chooses random exponents ν1,ν3, φ1,φ2,φ3 ∈ Zp and sets pi = φ2 +ν3φ3.
It selects random exponents yg,x,y,yw,yv ∈ Zp and sets g = kyg ,u = gx,h = gy,w1 = kywφ1 ,w2 = kywφ2 ,w3 =
kywφ3 ,w = kyw , gˆ = ˆkyg , uˆ = gˆx, ˆh = gˆy, vˆ = ˆkyv . It implicitly sets ν2 = a,τ = φ1 + ν1φ2 + aφ3,α = ab and
publishes a public key PK as
g,u,h, w1,w2,w3,w, gˆ, gˆν1 , gˆν2 = (ˆka)yg , gˆ−τ = ˆk−yg(φ1+ν1φ2)(ˆka)−ygφ3 ,
uˆ, uˆν1 , uˆν2 = (gˆν2)x, uˆ−τ = (gˆ−τ)x, ˆh, ˆhν1 , ˆhν2 = (gˆν2)y, ˆh−τ = (gˆ−τ)y,
vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi , Ω = e(ka, ˆkb)y2g .
Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and semi-functional verification. A
adaptively requests a signature for a message M. To respond to this query, B3 selects random exponents
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r,c1,c2,sk,z
′
k ∈ Zp and creates a semi-functional signature by implicitly setting zk = byg/sk + z′k as
W1,1 = (uMh)rwc11 (k
b)ν1ν3yg kν1ν3skz′k(ka)−skz′k ,
W1,2 = wc12 (k
b)−ν3yg k−ν3skz′k , W1,3 = wc13 (k
b)yg kskz′k , W1,4 = wc1 ,
W2,1 = grwc21 k
ν1ν3sk(ka)−sk , W2,2 = wc22 k
−ν3sk , W2,3 = wc23 k
sk , W2,4 = wc2 .
The simulator can only create a semi-functional signature since sk,zk enables the cancellation of kab. Finally,
A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,4) on a message M∗. To verify the forged signature, B3
first chooses random exponents s1,s2,s′c,z′c ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification components by
implicitly setting t = c, sc =−acyg + s′c, zc =−acyg(xM∗+ y)/sc + z′c/sc as
V1,1 = (ˆkc)yg , V1,2 = (ˆkc)ygν1 vˆs1 , V1,3 = vˆν3s1 ˆks
′
c , V1,4 = (ˆkc)−yg(φ1+ν1φ2)vˆ−pis1 ˆk−φ3s
′
c ,
V2,1 = (ˆkc)yg(xM
∗+y), V2,2 = (ˆkc)yg(xM
∗+y)ν1 vˆs2 , V2,3 = vˆν3s2 ˆkz
′
c ,
V2,4 = (ˆkc)−yg(xM
∗+y)(φ1+ν1φ2)vˆ−pis2 ˆk−φ3z′c .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= (T )y
2
g . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0.
Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T = e(k, ˆk)abc is the
same as G2. The public key is correctly distributed since the random blinding values yg,yw,yv are used. The
semi-functional signature is correctly distributed as
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 ( f ν1ν3−ν2)skzk = kygab(uMh)rwc11 (kν1ν3−a)sk(byg/sk+z
′
k)
= (uMh)rwc11 (k
b)ν1ν3yg kν1ν3skz′k(ka)−skz′k .
The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
V1,3 = (gˆν2)t(vˆν3)s1 ˆf sc = (ˆkyga)cvˆν3s1 ˆk−acyg+s′c = vˆν3s1 ˆks′c ,
V1,4 = (gˆ−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s1( ˆf−φ3)sc = (ˆk−yg(φ1+ν1φ2+aφ3))cvˆ−pis1 ˆk−φ3(−acyg+s′c) = (ˆkc)−yg(φ1+ν1φ2)vˆ−pis1 ˆk−φ3s′c ,
V2,3 = (uˆν2M
∗
ˆhν2)t(vˆν3)s2 ˆf sczc = (ˆkyga(xM∗+y))c(vˆν3)s2 ˆk−acyg(xM∗+y)+z′c = vˆν3s2 ˆkz′c ,
V2,4 = (uˆ−τM
∗
ˆh−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s2( ˆf−φ3)sczc = (ˆk−yg(φ1+ν1φ2+aφ3)(xM∗+y))c(vˆ−pi)s2(ˆk−φ3)−acyg(xM∗+y)+z′c
= (ˆkc)−yg(xM∗+y)(φ1+ν1φ2)vˆ−pis2 ˆk−φ3z′c ,
Ωt = e(g, gˆ)αt = e(k, ˆk)y2gabc = (T0)y
2
g .
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = e(k, ˆk)d is almost the same as G3. It is
obvious that the signature verification for the forged signature always fails if T1 = e(k, ˆk)d is used except
with 1/p probability since d is a random value in Zp. This completes our proof.
3.3.2 Analysis of PKS2
Theorem 3.7. The above PKS2 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the
LW1, LW2, DBDH assumptions hold. That is, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT algorithms
B1,B2,B3 such that AdvPKSA (λ )≤ AdvLW1B1 (λ )+qAdv
LW2
B2
(λ )+AdvDBDHB3 (λ ) where q is the maximum num-
ber of signature queries of A.
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Proof. Before proving the security, we first define two additional algorithms for semi-functional types. For
the semi-functionality, we set f = gy f , ˆf = gˆy f where y f is a random exponent in Zp.
PKS2.SignSF. The semi-functional signing algorithm first creates a normal signature using the private key.
Let (W ′1,1, . . . ,W ′2,3) be the normal signature of a message M with random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp. It
selects random exponents sk,zk ∈ Zp and outputs a semi-functional signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 =W ′1,1 · ( f−ν)skzk , W1,2 =W ′1,2 · f skzk , W1,3 =W ′1,3,
W2,1 =W ′2,1 · ( f−ν)sk , W2,2 =W ′2,2 · f sk , W2,3 =W ′2,3
)
.
PKS2.VerifySF. The semi-functional verification algorithm first creates normal verification components
using the public key. Let (V ′1,1, . . . ,V ′2,3) be the normal verification components with a random ex-
ponent t ∈ Zp. It chooses random exponents sc,zc ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification
components as
V1,1 =V ′1,1, V1,2 =V ′1,2 · ˆf sc , V1,3 =V ′1,3 · ( ˆf−φ2)sc ,
V2,1 =V ′2,1, V2,2 =V ′2,2 · ˆf sczc , V2,3 =V ′2,3 · ( ˆf−φ2)sczc .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
If the semi-functional verification algorithm is used to verify a semi-functional signature, then an additional
random element e( f , ˆf )sksc(zk−zc) is left in the left part of the above verification equation. If zk = zc, then
the semi-functional verification algorithm succeeds. In this case, we say that the signature is nominally
semi-functional.
The security proof uses a sequence of games G0,G1,G2, and G3. The definition of these games is the
same as that of Theorem 3.3. From the following three lemmas, we prove that it is hard for A to distinguish
Gi−1 from Gi under the given assumptions. Therefore, we have that
AdvPKSA (λ ) = AdvG0A +
2
∑
i=1
(
AdvGi
A
−AdvGi
A
)
−AdvG3
A
≤
3
∑
i=1
∣∣AdvGi−1
A
−AdvGi
A
∣∣
= AdvLW1B1 (λ )+
q
∑
k=1
AdvLW2B2 (λ )+Adv
DBDH
B3 (λ ).
This completes our proof.
Lemma 3.8. If the LW1 assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G0
and G1 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B1 such
that
∣∣AdvG0
A
−AdvG1
A
∣∣= AdvLW1B1 (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G0 and G1 with non-negligible
advantage. A simulator B1 that solves the LW1 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,kb, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆkab
2
, ˆkb2 , ˆkb3 , ˆkc, ˆkac, ˆkbc, ˆkb2c, ˆkb3c) and T where T = T0 = ˆkab
2c or T = T1 =
ˆkab2c+d . ThenB1 that interacts withA is described as follows: B1 first chooses random exponents φ2,A,B,α ∈
Zp, random values yg,yu,yh,yw ∈Zp. It computes w1 =wφ1 = (kb)yw ,w2 =wφ2 = kywφ2 ,w= kyw by implicitly
18
setting φ1 = b. It implicitly sets cg =−b/yw + c′g,cu =−bA/yw + c′u,ch =−bB/yw + c′h,ν = a,τ = b+aφ2
and publishes a public key PK by selecting random values c′g,c′u,c′h ∈ Zp as
gwcg1 = k
yg w
c′g
1 , w
cg
2 = (k
b)−b2w
c′g
2 , w
cg = (kb)−1wc′g ,
uw
cu
1 = k
yu w
c′u
1 , w
cu
2 = (k
b)−b2Aw
c′u
2 , w
cu = (kb)−Awc′u ,
hwch1 = k
yh w
c′h
1 , w
ch
2 = (k
b)−b2Bw
c′h
2 , w
ch = (kb)−Bwc′h , w1, w2, w,
gˆ = ˆkb2 ˆkyg , gˆν = ˆkab2(ˆka)yg , gˆ−τ = (ˆkb3(ˆkb)yg(ˆkab2)b2(ˆka)ygb2)−1,
uˆ = (ˆkb2)A ˆkyu , uˆν = (ˆkab2)A(ˆka)yu , uˆ−τ = ((ˆkb3)A(ˆkb)yu(ˆkab2)Ab2(ˆka)yub2)−1,
ˆh = (ˆkb2)B ˆkyh , ˆhν = (ˆkab2)B(ˆka)yh , ˆh−τ = ((ˆkb3)B(ˆkb)yh(ˆkab2)Bb2(ˆka)yhb2)−1,
Ω = (e(kb3 , ˆkb) · e(kb2 , ˆk)2yg · e(k, ˆk)y2g)α .
It implicitly sets g = kb2 kyg ,u = (kb2)Akyu ,h = (kb2)Bkyh , but it cannot create these elements since kb2 is
not given. Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and verification. A adap-
tively requests a signature for a message M. To response this sign query, B1 first selects random exponents
r,c′1,c
′
2 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets c1 = −b(α +(AM+B)r)/yw + c′1,c2 = −br1/yw + c′2 and creates a normal
signature as
W1,1 = kygα+(yuM+yh)r(w1)c
′
1 , W1,2 = (W1,3)φ2 , W1,3 = (kb)−(α+(AM+B)r)wc
′
1 ,
W2,1 = kygr(w1)c
′
2 , W2,2 = (W2,3)φ2 , W2,3 = (kb)−rwc
′
2 .
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,3) on a message M∗ from A. To verify the forged
signature, B1 first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes verification components by implicitly
setting t = c as
V1,1 = ˆkb
2c(ˆkc)yg , V1,2 = T (ˆkac)yg , V1,3 = ((ˆkb
3c)(ˆkbc)yg(T )φ2(ˆkac)ygφ2)−1,
V2,1 = (ˆkb
2c)AM
∗+B(ˆkc)yuM∗+yh , V2,2 = (T )AM
∗+B(ˆkac)yuM∗+yh ,
V2,3 =
(
(ˆkb3c)AM∗+B(ˆkbc)yuM∗+yh(T )φ2(AM∗+B)(ˆkac)φ2(yuM∗+yh)
)−1
.
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0.
Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish this proof, we show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show that the
distribution using D,T0 = ˆkab
2c is the same as G0. The public key is correctly distributed as
gwcg1 = (k
b2 kyg)(kbyw)−b/yw+c′g = kygwc
′
g
1 .
The simulator cannot create g,u,h since kb2 is not given in the assumption, but it can create gwcg1 ,uw
cu
1 ,hw
ch
1
since cg,cu,ch can be used to cancel out kb
2
. The signature is correctly distributed as
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 = (k
b2+yg)α(k(b2A+yu)Mkb2B+yh)r(kbyw)−b(α+(AM+B)r)/yw+c′1
= kygα+(yuM+yh)rwc
′
1
1 ,
W2,1 = gr(wb1)c2 = (kb
2+yg)r(kbyw)−br/yw+c′2 = kygr(wb1)c′2 .
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It can create a normal signature since c1,c2 enable the cancellation of kb
2
, but it cannot create a semi-
functional signature since ka is not given. The verification components are correctly distributed as
V1,1 = gˆt = (ˆkb
2+yg)c = ˆkb2c(ˆkc)yg , V1,2 = (gˆν )t = ˆk(b
2+yg)ac = T0(ˆkac)yg ,
V1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t = (ˆk(b
2+yg)(b+aφ2)c)−1 = ((ˆkb3c)(ˆkbc)yg(T0)φ2(ˆkac)ygφ2)−1,
V2,1 = (uM
∗h)t = (k(b2A+yu)M∗kb2B+yh)c = (kb2c)AM∗+B(kc)yuM∗+yh ,
V2,2 = ((uν)M
∗hν)t = (k(b2A+yu)aM∗k(b2B+yh)a)c = (T0)AM
∗+B(kac)yuM∗+yh ,
V2,3 = ((u−τ)M
∗h−τ)t = ((k(b2A+yu)(b+aφ2)M∗k(b2B+yh)(b+aφ2))c)−1
= ((kb3c)AM∗+B(kbc)yuM∗+yh(T0)φ2(AM
∗+B)(kac)φ2(yuM∗+yh))−1.
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = ˆkab
2c+d is the same as G1. We only
consider the distribution of the verification components since T is only used in the verification components.
The difference between T0 and T1 is that T1 additionally has ˆkd . Thus V1,2,V1,3,V2,2,V2,3 that have T in
the simulation additionally have ˆkd ,(ˆkd)φ2 ,(ˆkd)AM∗+B,(ˆkd)φ2(AM∗+B) respectively. If we implicitly set sc =
d,zc = AM∗+B, then the verification components of the forged signature are semi-functional since A and B
are information-theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof.
Lemma 3.9. If the LW2 assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between G1
and G2 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B2 such
that
∣∣AdvG1,k−1
A
−AdvG1,k
A
∣∣= AdvLW2B2 (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G1,k−1 and G1,k with non-negligible
advantage. A simulator B2 that solves the LW2 assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,kb,kc, ˆka, ˆka
2
, ˆkbx, ˆkabx, ˆka2x) and T where T = T0 = kbc or T = T1 = kbc+d . Then B2
that interacts with A is described as follows: B2 first selects random exponents ν ,yτ ,A,B,α ,yu,yh,yw ∈ Zp.
It computes w1 = wφ1 = ((kb)−νkakyτ )yw ,w2 = wφ2 = (kb)yw ,w = kyw by implicitly setting φ1 = −νb+
(a+ yτ),φ2 = b. It implicitly sets τ = a+ yτ and publishes a public key PK by selecting random values
cg,cu,ch ∈ Zp as
gwcg1 = k
aw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg , uwcu1 = (k
a)Akyu wcu1 ,w
cu
2 ,w
cu , hwch1 = (k
a)Bkyh wch1 ,w
ch
2 ,w
ch , w1,w2,w,
gˆ = ˆka, gˆν , gˆ−τ = (ˆka2(ˆka)yτ )−1), uˆ = (ˆka)A ˆkyu , uˆν , uˆ−τ = ((ˆka2)A(ˆka)yu+Ayτ ˆkyuyτ )−1,
ˆh = (ˆka)B ˆkyh , ˆhν , ˆh−τ = ((ˆka2)B(ˆka)yh+Byτ ˆkyhyτ )−1, Ω = e(ka, ˆka)α .
Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and verification. A adaptively requests a
signature for a message M. If this is a j-th signature query, then B2 handles this query as follows:
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional signature by calling PKS2.SignSF since it knows the tuple
( f−ν , f ,1) for the semi-functional signature.
• Case j = k : It selects random exponents r′,c′1,c′2 ∈ Zp and creates a signature by implicitly setting
r =−c+ r′, c1 = c(AM+B)/yw + c′1, c2 = c/yw + c′2 as
W1,1 = gα(kc)−(yuM+yh)(uMh)r
′
(T )−ν(AM+B)(kc)yτ (AM+B)wc
′
1
1 , W1,2 = (T )
(AM+B)w
c′1
2 ,
W1,3 = (kc)(AM+B)wc
′
1 , W2,1 = gr
′
(T )−ν(kc)yτ wc
′
2
1 , W2,2 = Tw
c′2
2 , W2,3 = k
cwc
′
2 .
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• Case j > k : It creates a normal signature by calling PKS2.Sign since it knows the private key.
Finally, A outputs a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,3) on a message M∗. To verify the forged signa-
ture, B2 first chooses a random exponent t ′ ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification components by
implicitly setting t = bx+ t ′, sc =−a2x, zc = AM∗+B as
V1,1 = ˆkabx(ˆka)t
′
, V1,2 = (ˆkabx)ν(ˆka)νt
′
(ˆka2x)−1, V1,3 = (ˆkabx)−yτ (gˆ−yτ )t
′
,
V2,1 = (ˆkabx)AM
∗+B(ˆkbx)yuM∗+yh(uˆM∗ ˆh)t ′ , V2,2 = (ˆkabx)(AM
∗+B)ν(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν(uˆM∗ ˆh)νt ′,
V2,3 = (ˆkabx)−(AM
∗+B)yτ (ˆkabx)−(yuM∗+yh)(ˆkbx)−(yuM∗+yh)yτ ((uˆ−τ)M∗ ˆh−τ)t ′ .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1
?
= e(ka, ˆkabx)α · e(ka, ˆka)αt ′ . If this equation holds,
then it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we should show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We first show
that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = kbc is the same as G1,k−1. The public key is correctly
distributed since the random blinding values yu,yh,yw are used. The k-th signature is correctly distributed as
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 = g
α(k(aA+yu)MkaB+yh)−c+r′(kyw(−νb+a+yτ))c(AM+B)/yw+c′1
= gα(kc)−(yuM+yh)(uMh)r′(T )−ν(AM+B)(kc)yτ (AM+B)wc
′
1
1 ,
W1,2 = wc12 = (k
ywb)c(AM+B)/yw+c
′
1 = (T )(AM+B)wc
′
1
2 ,
W1,3 = wc1 = (kyw)c(AM+B)/yw+c
′
1 = (kc)(AM+B)wc′1 .
The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
V2,1 = (uˆM
∗
ˆh)t = (ˆk(aA+yu)M∗ ˆkaB+yh)bx+t ′ = (ˆkabx)AM∗+B(ˆkbx)yuM∗+yh(uˆM∗ ˆh)t ′ ,
V2,2 = ((uˆν )M
∗
ˆhν)t ˆf sczc = (ˆk(aA+yu)νM∗ ˆk(aB+yh)ν)bx+t ′ ˆk−a2x(AM∗+B)
= (ˆkabx)(AM∗+B)ν(ˆkbx)(yuM∗+yh)ν((uˆν)M∗ ˆhν)t ′(ˆka2x)−(AM∗+B),
V2,3 = ((uˆ−τ )M
∗
ˆh−τ)t( ˆf−φ2)sczc = (ˆk−(aA+yu)(a+yτ )M∗ ˆk−(aB+yh)(a+yτ ))bx+t ′ ˆk−b(−a2x)(AM∗+B)
= (ˆkabx)−(AM∗+B)yτ−(yuM∗+yh)(ˆkbx)−(yuM∗+yh)yτ ((uˆ−τ)M∗ ˆh−τ)t ′ .
The simulator can create the semi-functional verification components with only fixed zc = AM∗+B since
sc,sc enable the cancellation of ˆka
2bx
. Even though it uses the fixed zc, the distribution of zc is correct since
A,B are information theoretically hidden to A. We next show that the distribution of the simulation using
D,T1 = kbc+d is the same as G1,k. We only consider the distribution of the k-th signature since T is only used
in the k-th signature. The only difference between T0 and T1 is that T1 additionally has kd . The signature
components W1,1,W1,2, W2,1,W2,2 that have T in the simulation additionally have (kd)−ν(AM+B), (kd)(AM+B),
(kd)−ν , kd respectively. If we implicitly set sk = d,zk = AM+B, then the distribution of the k-th signature
is the same as G1,k except that the k-th signature is nominally semi-functional.
Finally, we show that A cannot distinguish the nominally semi-functional signature from the semi-
functional signature. The main idea of this is that A cannot request a signature for the forgery message M∗
in the security model. Suppose there exists an unbounded adversary, then he can gather zk = AM+B from
the k-th signature and zc = AM∗+B from the forged signature. It is easy to show that zk,zc look random to
the unbounded adversary since f (M) = AM+B is a pair-wise independent function and A,B are information
theoretically hidden to the adversary. This completes our proof.
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Lemma 3.10. If the DBDH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
G2 and G3 with non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B3
such that
∣∣AdvG2
A
−AdvG3
A
∣∣= AdvDBDHB3 (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguish G2 from G3 with non-negligible advantage. A
simulator B3 that solves the DBDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),
k,ka,kb,kc, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆkc) and T where T = T0 = e(k, ˆk)abc or T = T1 = e(k, ˆk)d . Then B3 that interacts with
A is described as follows: B3 first chooses random exponents φ1,φ2,yg,x,y ∈ Zp and a random element
w ∈ G. It computes g = kyg ,u = gx,h = gy, gˆ = ˆkyg , uˆ = gˆx, ˆh = gˆy,w1 = wφ1,w2 = wφ2 . It implicitly sets
ν = a,τ = φ1 +aφ2,α = ab and publishes a public key PK by selecting random values cg,cu,ch ∈ Zp as
gwcg1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg , uwcu1 ,w
cu
2 ,w
cu , hwch1 ,w
ch
2 ,w
ch , w1,w2,w,
gˆ, gˆν = (ˆka)yg , gˆ−τ = ˆk−ygφ1(ˆka)−ygφ2 , uˆ, uˆν = (gˆν)x, uˆ−τ = (gˆ−τ)x,
ˆh, ˆhν = (gˆν )y, ˆh−τ = (gˆ−τ)y, Ω = e(ka, ˆkb)y2g .
Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional signature and semi-functional verification. A
adaptively requests a signature for a message M. To respond to this query, B3 selects random exponents
r,c1,c2,sk,z
′
k ∈ Zp and creates a semi-functional signature by implicitly setting zk = byg/sk + z′k as
W1,1 = (uMh)rwc11 (k
a)−skz
′
k , W1,2 = wc12 (k
b)yg kskz′k , W1,3 = wc1 ,
W2,1 = grwc21 (k
a)−sk , W2,2 = wc22 k
sk , W2,3 = wc2 .
It can only create a semi-functional signature since sk,zk enables the cancellation of kab. Finally, A outputs
a forged signature σ ∗ = (W ∗1,1, . . . ,W ∗2,3) on a message M∗. To verify the forged signature, B3 first chooses
random exponents s1,s2,s′c,z′c ∈ Zp and computes semi-functional verification components by implicitly
setting t = c, sc =−acyg + s′c, zc =−acyg(xM∗+ y)/sc + z′c/sc as
V1,1 = (ˆkc)yg , V1,2 = ˆks
′
c , V1,3 = (ˆkc)−ygφ1 ˆk−φ2s
′
c ,
V2,1 = (ˆkc)yg(xM
∗+y), V2,2 = ˆkz
′
c , V2,3 = (ˆkc)−ygφ1(xM
∗+y)
ˆk−φ2z′c .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W ∗1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W ∗2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= (T )y
2
g . If this equation holds, then it outputs 0.
Otherwise, it outputs 1.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T = e(k, ˆk)abc is the
same as G2. The public key is correctly distributed since the random values yg,x,y,cg,cu,ch are used. The
semi-functional signature is correctly distributed as
W1,1 = gα(uMh)rwc11 ( f−ν)skzk = kygab(uMh)rwc11 (k−a)sk(byg/sk+z
′
k) = (uMh)rwc11 (k
a)−skz
′
k .
The simulator can only create a semi-functional signature since zk = byg/sk + z′k enables the cancellation of
kab. The semi-functional verification components are correctly distributed as
V1,1 = gˆt = (ˆkyg)c = (ˆkc)yg , V1,2 = (gˆν)t ˆf sc = (ˆkyga)c ˆk−acyg+s′c = ˆks′c ,
V1,3 = (gˆ−τ )t( ˆf−φ2)sc = (ˆk−yg(φ1+aφ2))c ˆk−φ2(−acyg+s′c) = (ˆkc)−ygφ1 ˆk−φ2s′c ,
V2,1 = (uˆM
∗
ˆh)t = (ˆkyg(xM∗+y))c = (ˆkc)yg(xM∗+y),
V2,2 = (uˆνM
∗
ˆhν)t ˆf sczc = (ˆkyga(xM∗+y))c ˆk−acyg(xM∗+y)+z′c = ˆkz′c ,
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V2,3 = (uˆ−τM
∗
ˆh−τ)t( ˆf−φ2)sczc = (ˆk−yg(φ1+aφ2)(xM∗+y))c(ˆk−φ2)−acyg(xM∗+y)+z′c
= (ˆkc)−ygφ1(xM∗+y) ˆk−φ2z′c ,
Ωt = e(g, gˆ)αt = e(k, ˆk)y2gabc = (T0)y
2
g .
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = e(k, ˆk)d is almost the same as G3. It is
obvious that the signature verification for the forged signature always fails if T1 = e(k, ˆk)d is used except
with 1/p probability since d is a random value in Zp. This completes our proof.
4 Sequential Aggregate Signature
In this section, we propose two SAS schemes with short public keys and prove their security based on that
of our PKS schemes.
4.1 Definitions
The concept of SAS was introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [29]. In SAS, all signers first generate public keys
and private keys, and then publishes their public keys. To generate a sequential aggregate signature, a signer
may receive an aggregate-so-far from a previous signer, and creates a new aggregate signature by adding his
signature to the aggregate-so-far in sequential order. After that, the signer may send the aggregate signature
to a next signer. A verifier can check the validity of the aggregate signature by using the pubic keys of all
signers in the aggregate signature. An SAS scheme is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Sequential Aggregate Signature). A sequential aggregate signature (SAS) scheme consists
of four PPT algorithms Setup, KeyGen, AggSign, and AggVerify, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ and outputs public parameters PP.
KeyGen(PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, and outputs a public
key PK and a private key SK.
AggSign(AS′,M,PK,M,SK). The aggregate signing algorithm takes as input an aggregate-so-far AS′ on
messages M = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl), a message M, and a private key
SK, and outputs a new aggregate signature AS.
AggVerify(AS,M,PK). The aggregate verification algorithm takes as input an aggregate signature AS
on messages M = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl), and outputs either 1 or 0
depending on the validity of the sequential aggregate signature.
The correctness requirement is that for each PP output by Setup, for all (PK,SK) output by KeyGen,
any M, we have that AggVerify(AggSign(AS′,M′,PK′,M,SK),M′||M,PK′||PK) = 1 where AS′ is a valid
aggregate-so-far signature on messages M′ under public keys PK′.
A trivial SAS scheme can be constructed from a PKS scheme by concatenating each signer’s signature
in sequential order, but the size of aggregate signature is proportional to the size of signers. Therefore, a
non-trivial SAS scheme should satisfy the signature compactness property that requires the size of aggregate
signature to be independent of the size of signers.
The security model of SAS was defined by Lysyanskaya et al. [29], but we follow the security model
of Lu et al. [27] that requires for an adversary to register the key-pairs of other signers except the target
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signer, namely the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) setting or the proof of knowledge (POK) setting. In this
security model, an adversary first given the public key of a target signer. After that, the adversary adaptively
requests a certification for a public key by registering the key-pair of other signer, and he adaptively requests
a sequential aggregate signature by providing a previous aggregate signature to the signing oracle. Finally,
the adversary outputs a forged sequential aggregate signature on messages under public keys. If the forged
sequential signature satisfies the conditions of the security model, then the adversary wins the security game.
The security model of SAS is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Security). The security notion of existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack
is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C first initializes a certification list CL as empty. Next, it runs Setup to obtain public parame-
ters PP and KeyGen to obtain a key pair (PK,SK), and gives PK to A.
2. Certification Query: A adaptively requests the certification of a public key by providing a key pair
(PK,SK). Then C adds the key pair (PK,SK) to CL if the key pair is a valid one.
3. Signature Query: A adaptively requests a sequential aggregate signature (by providing an aggregate-
so-far AS′ on messages M′ under public keys PK′), on a message M to sign under the challenge public
key PK, and receives a sequential aggregate signature AS.
4. Output: Finally (after a sequence of the above queries), A outputs a forged sequential aggregate
signature AS∗ on messages M∗ under public keys PK∗. C outputs 1 if the forged signature satisfies the
following three conditions, or outputs 0 otherwise: 1) AggVerify(AS∗,M∗,PK∗)= 1, 2) The challenge
public key PK must exists in PK∗ and each public key in PK∗ except the challenge public key must
be in CL, and 3) The corresponding message M in M∗ of the challenge public key PK must not have
been queried by A to the sequential aggregate signing oracle.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvSASA (λ ) = Pr[C = 1] where the probability is taken over all the ran-
domness of the experiment. An SAS scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if all
PPT adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above experiment.
4.2 Construction
To construct an SAS scheme from a PKS scheme, the PKS scheme should support multi-users by sharing
some elements among all signers and the randomness of signatures should be sequentially aggregated to a
single value. We can employ the randomness reuse technique of Lu et al. [27] to aggregate the randomness
of signatures. To apply the randomness reuse technique, we should re-randomize the aggregate signature to
prevent a forgery attack. Thus we build on the PKS schemes of the previous section that support multi-users
and public re-randomization to construct SAS schemes.
4.2.1 Our SAS1 Scheme
Our first SAS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
SAS1.Setup(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈G and gˆ, vˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it chooses random exponents
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ν1,ν2,ν3,φ1,φ2,φ3 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + ν1φ2 + ν2φ3,pi = φ2 + ν3φ3. It also sets w1 = wφ1,w2 =
wφ2 ,w3 = wφ3 . It publishes public parameters as
PP =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), g, w1,w2,w3,w, gˆ, gˆν1 , gˆν2 , gˆ−τ , vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi
)
.
SAS1.KeyGen(PP): This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents
α ,x,y ∈Zp and computes u = gx,h = gy, uˆ = gˆx, uˆν1 = (gˆν1)x, uˆν2 = (gˆν2)x, uˆ−τ = (gˆ−τ )x, ˆh = gˆy, ˆhν1 =
(gˆν1)y, ˆhν2 = (gˆν2)y, ˆh−τ = (gˆ−τ)y. It outputs a private key SK = (α ,x,y) and a public key as
PK =
(
u,h, uˆ, uˆν1 , uˆν2 , uˆ−τ , ˆh, ˆhν1 , ˆhν2 , ˆh−τ , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
SAS1.AggSign(AS′,M′,PK′,M,SK): This algorithm takes as input an aggregate-so-far AS′=(S′1,1, . . . ,S′2,4)
on messages M′=(M1, . . . ,Ml−1) under public keys PK′=(PK1, . . . ,PKl−1) where PKi =(ui,hi, . . . ,Ωi),
a message M ∈ {0,1}k where k < λ , a private key SK = (α ,x,y) with PK = (u,h, . . . ,Ω) and PP. It
first checks the validity of AS′ by calling AggVerify(AS′,M′,PK′). If AS′ is not valid, then it halts. If
the public key PK of SK does already exist in PK′, then it halts. Next, it creates temporal aggregate
components by using the randomness of the previous aggregate-so-far as
T1,1 = S′1,1 ·gα(S′2,1)xM+y, T1,2 = S′1,2 · (S′2,2)xM+y, T1,3 = S′1,3 · (S′2,3)xM+y,
T1,4 = S′1,4 · (S′2,4)xM+y, T2,1 = S′2,1, T2,2 = S′2,2, T2,3 = S′2,3, T2,4 = S′2,4.
Finally, it selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp for re-randomization and outputs an aggregate sig-
nature as
AS =
(
S1,1 = T1,1 ·
l−1
∏
i=1
(uMii hi)
r(uMh)rwc11 ,S1,2 = T1,2 ·w
c1
2 ,S1,3 = T1,3 ·w
c1
3 ,S1,4 = T1,4 ·w
c1 ,
S2,1 = T2,1 ·grwc21 ,S2,2 = T2,2 ·w
c2
2 ,S2,3 = T2,3 ·w
c2
3 ,S2,4 = T2,4 ·w
c2
)
.
SAS1.AggVerify(AS,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a sequential aggregate signature AS on mes-
sages M = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) where PKi = (ui,hi, . . . ,Ωi). It first
checks that any public key does not appear twice in PK and that any public key in PK has been cer-
tified. If these checks fail, then it outputs 0. If l = 0, then it outputs 1 if S1 = S2 = 1, 0 otherwise. It
chooses random exponents t,s1,s2 ∈ Zp and computes verification components as
C1,1 = gˆt , C1,2 = (gˆν1)t vˆs1 , C1,3 = (gˆν2)t(vˆν3)s1 , C1,4 = (gˆ−τ)t(vˆ−pi)s1 ,
C2,1 =
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t , C2,2 =
l
∏
i=1
((uˆν1i )
Mi ˆhν1i )
t vˆs2 , C2,3 =
l
∏
i=1
((uˆν2i )
Mi ˆhν2i )
t(vˆν3)s2 ,
C2,4 =
l
∏
i=1
((uˆ−τi )
Mi ˆh−τi )
t(vˆ−pi)s2 .
Next, it verifies that ∏4i=1 e(S1,i,C1,i) ·∏4i=1 e(S2,i,C2,i)−1 ?= ∏li=1 Ωti . If this equation holds, then it
outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
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The aggregate signature AS is a valid sequential aggregate signature on messages M′||M under public
keys PK′||PK with randomness r˜ = r′+r, c˜1 = c′1+c′2(xM+y)+c1, c˜2 = c′2+c2 where r′,c′1,c′2 are random
values in AS′. The sequential aggregate signature has the following form
S1,1 =
l
∏
i=1
gαi
l
∏
i=1
(uMii hi)
r˜w
c˜1
1 , S1,2 = w
c˜1
2 , S1,3 = w
c˜1
3 , S1,4 = w
c˜1 ,
S2,1 = gr˜wc˜21 , S2,2 = w
c˜2
2 , S2,3 = w
c˜2
3 , S2,4 = w
c˜2 .
4.2.2 Our SAS2 Scheme
Our second SAS scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
SAS2.Setup(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈ G and gˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it selects random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 +νφ2, w1 = wφ1 ,w2 = wφ2 . It publishes public parameters by selecting
a random value cg ∈ Zp as
PP =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), gw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg , w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ , Λ = e(g, gˆ)
)
.
SAS2.KeyGen(PP): This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP. It selects random exponents
α ,x,y∈Zp and sets uˆ= gˆx, ˆh= gˆy. It outputs a private key SK = (α ,x,y) and a public key by selecting
random values c′u,c′h ∈ Zp as
PK =
(
uw
cu
1 = (gw
cg
1 )
xw
c′u
1 ,w
cu
2 = (w
cg
2 )
xw
c′u
2 ,w
cu = (wcg)xw
c′u
2 ,
hwch1 = (gw
cg
1 )
yw
c′u
1 ,w
ch
2 = (w
cg
2 )
yw
c′u
2 ,w
ch = (wcg)yw
c′u
2 ,
uˆ, uˆν = (gˆν)x, uˆ−τ = (gˆ−τ)x, ˆh, ˆhν = (gˆν)y, ˆh−τ = (gˆ−τ)y, Ω = Λα
)
.
SAS2.AggSign(AS′,M′,PK′,M,SK): This algorithm takes as input an aggregate-so-far AS′=(S′1,1, . . . ,S′2,3)
on messages M′=(M1, . . . ,Ml−1) under public keys PK′=(PK1, . . . ,PKl−1) where PKi =(uiw
cu,i
1 , . . . ,Ωi),
a message M ∈ Zp, a private key SK = (α ,x,y) with PK = (uwcu1 , . . . ,Ω) and PP. It first checks the
validity of AS′ by calling SAS.AggVerify(AS′,M′,PK′). If AS′ is not valid, then it halts. If the public
key PK of SK does already exist in PK′, then it halts. Next, it creates temporal aggregate components
by using the randomness of the previous aggregate-so-far as
T1,1 = S′1,1(gw
cg
1 )
α(S′2,1)xM+y, T1,2 = S′1,2(w
cg
2 )
α(S′2,2)xM+y, T1,3 = S′1,3(wcg)α(S′2,3)xM+y,
T2,1 = S′2,1, T2,2 = S′2,2, T2,3 = S′2,3.
Finally it selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp for re-randomization and outputs an aggregate sig-
nature as
AS =
(
S1,1 = T1,1 ·
l
∏
i=1
((uiw
cu,i
1 )
Mi(hiw
ch,i
1 ))
rw
c1
1 ,
S1,2 = T1,2 ·
l
∏
i=1
((w
cu,i
2 )
Mi(w
ch,i
2 ))
rw
c1
2 , S1,3 = T1,3 ·
l
∏
i=1
((wcu,i)Mi(wch,i))rwc1 ,
S2,1 = T2,1 · (gw
cg
1 )
rw
c2
1 , S2,2 = T2,2 · (w
cg
2 )
rw
c2
2 , S2,3 = T2,3 · (w
cg)rwc2
)
.
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SAS2.AggVerify(AS,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a sequential aggregate signature AS on mes-
sages M = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) where PKi = (uiw
cu,i
1 , . . . ,Ωi). It first
checks that any public key does not appear twice in PK and that any public key in PK has been
certified. If these checks fail, then it outputs 0. If l = 0, then it outputs 1 if S1,1 = · · · = S2,3 = 1, 0
otherwise. It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes verification components as
C1,1 = gˆt , C1,2 = (gˆν)t , C1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t ,
C2,1 =
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t , C2,2 =
l
∏
i=1
((uˆνi )
Mi ˆhνi )t , C2,3 =
l
∏
i=1
((uˆ−τi )
Mi ˆh−τi )
t .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(S1,i,C1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(S2,i,C2,i)−1 ?= ∏li=1 Ωti . If this equation holds, then it
outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Let r′,c′1,c′2 be the randomness of an aggregate-so-far. If we implicitly sets r˜ = r′+ r, c˜1 = c′1 + cgαl +
∑li=1(cu,iMi + ch,i)r+ c1, c˜2 = c′2 + cgr+ c2, then the aggregate signature is correctly distributed as
S1,1 =
l
∏
i=1
gαi
l
∏
i=1
(uMii hi)
r˜w
c˜1
1 , S1,2 = w
c˜1
2 , S1,3 = w
c˜1 ,
S2,1 = gr˜wc˜21 , S2,2 = w
c˜2
2 , S2,3 = w
c˜2 .
4.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 4.3. The above SAS1 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the
PKS1 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack. That is, for any PPT adversary
A for the above SAS1 scheme, there exists a PPT algorithm B for the PKS1 scheme such that AdvSASA (λ )≤
AdvPKSB (λ ).
Proof. Our overall proof strategy for this part follows Lu et al. [27] and adapts it to our setting. The proof
uses two properties: the fact that the aggregated signature result is independent of the order of aggregation,
and the fact that the simulator of the SAS system possesses the private keys of all but the target PKS.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that forges the above SAS1 scheme with non-negligible advan-
tage ε . A simulator B that forges the PKS1 scheme is first given: a challenge public key PKPKS =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,u,h,w1 , . . . ,w, gˆ, . . . , gˆ−τ , uˆ, . . . , uˆ−τ , ˆh, . . . , ˆh−τ , vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi ,Ω). Then B that interacts with
A is described as follows: B first constructs PP = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,w1, . . . ,w, gˆ, . . . , gˆ−τ , vˆ, vˆν3 , vˆ−pi) and
PK∗ = (u,h, uˆ, . . . , uˆ−τ , ˆh, . . . , ˆh−τ ,Ω = e(g, gˆ)α) from PKPKS. Next, it initializes a certification list CL as
an empty one and gives PP and PK∗ to A. A may adaptively requests certification queries or sequen-
tial aggregate signature queries. If A requests the certification of a public key by providing a public key
PKi = (ui,hi, . . . ,Ωi) and its private key SKi = (αi,xi,yi), then B checks the private key and adds the key
pair (PKi,SKi) to CL. IfA requests a sequential aggregate signature by providing an aggregate-so-far AS′ on
messages M′ = (M1, . . . ,Ml−1) under public keys PK′ = (PK1, . . . ,PKl−1), and a message M to sign under
the challenge private key of PK∗, then B proceeds the aggregate signature query as follows:
1. It first checks that the signature AS′ is valid and that each public key in PK′ exits in CL.
2. It queries its signing oracle that simulates PKS1.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key
PK∗ and obtains a signature σ .
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3. For each 1≤ i≤ l−1, it constructs an aggregate signature on message Mi using SAS1.AggSign since
it knows the private key that corresponds to PKi. The result signature is an aggregate signature for
messages M′||M under public keys PK′||PK∗ since this scheme does not check the order of aggrega-
tion. It gives the result signature AS to A.
Finally, A outputs a forged aggregate signature AS∗ = (S∗1,1, . . . ,S∗2,4) on messages M∗ = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under
public keys PK∗ = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK1 = PK∗. B
proceeds as follows:
1. B first checks the validity of AS∗ by calling SAS1.AggVerify. Additionally, the forged signature
should not be trivial: the challenge public key PK∗ must be in PK∗, and the message M1 must not be
queried by A to the signature query oracle.
2. For each 2 ≤ i ≤ l, it parses PKi = (ui,hi, . . . ,Ωi) from PK∗, and it retrieves the private key SKi =
(αi,xi,yi) of PKi from CL. It then computes
W1,1 = S∗1,1 ·
l
∏
i=2
(
gα j(S∗2,1)xiMi+yi
)−1
, W1,2 = S∗1,2 ·
l
∏
i=2
(
(S∗2,2)xiMi+yi
)−1
,
W1,3 = S∗1,3 ·
l
∏
i=2
(
(S∗2,3)xiMi+yi
)−1
, W1,4 = S∗1,4 ·
l
∏
i=2
(
(S∗2,4)xiMi+yi
)−1
,
W2,1 = S∗2,1, W2,2 = S∗2,2, W2,3 = S∗2,3, W2,4 = S∗2,4.
3. It outputs σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,4) as a non-trivial forgery of the PKS scheme since it did not make a
signing query on M1.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. It is obvious that
the public parameters and the public key are correctly distributed. The sequential aggregate signatures is
correctly distributed since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. Finally, we can show that
the result signature σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,4) of the simulator is a valid signature for the PKS1 scheme on the
message M1 under the public key PK∗ since it satisfies the following equation:
4
∏
i=1
e(W1,i,V1,i) ·
4
∏
i=1
e(W2,i,V2,i)−1
= e(S∗1,1, gˆt) · e(S∗1,2, gˆν1t vˆs1) · e(S∗1,3, gˆν2t vˆν3s1) · e(S∗1,4, gˆ−τt vˆ−pis1) · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1·
e(S∗2,1,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)ν1t vˆδis1)−1 · e(S∗2,3,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)ν2t vˆδis1)−1·
e(S∗2,4,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)−τt vˆ−piδis1)−1 · e(S∗2,1,(uˆM1 ˆh)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,(uˆM1 ˆh)ν1t vˆs2)−1·
e(S∗2,3,(uˆM1 ˆh)ν2t vˆν3s2)−1 · e(S∗2,4,(uˆM1 ˆh)−τt vˆ−pis2)−1
= e(S∗1,1,C1,1) · e(S∗1,2,C1,2) · e(S∗1,3,C1,3) · e(S∗1,4,C1,4) · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1·
e(S∗2,1,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)ν1t vˆs˜2)−1 · e(S∗2,3,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)ν2t vˆs˜2)−1·
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e(S∗2,4,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)−τt vˆ−pi s˜2)−1
=
4
∏
i=1
e(S∗1,i,C1,i) ·
4
∏
i=1
e(S∗2,i,C2,i)−1 · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1 =
l
∏
i=1
Ωti ·
l
∏
i=2
Ω−ti = Ω
t
1
where δi = xiMi + yi and s˜2 = ∑li=2(xiMi + yi)s1 + s2. This completes our proof.
Theorem 4.4. The above SAS2 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the
PKS2 scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack. That is, for any PPT adversary
A for the above SAS2 scheme, there exists a PPT algorithm B for the PKS2 scheme such that AdvSASA (λ )≤
AdvPKSB (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that forges the above SAS2 scheme with non-negligible ad-
vantage ε . A simulator B that forges the PKS2 scheme is first given: a challenge public key PKPKS =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),gw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg ,uwcu1 , . . . ,w
ch ,w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ , uˆ, . . . , ˆh−τ ,Ω). Then B that interacts with
A is described as follows: B first constructs PP= ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),gw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg ,w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ ,Λ) by
computing Λ = e(gwcg1 , gˆ) · e(w
cg
2 , gˆ
ν) · e(wcg , gˆ−τ) = e(g, gˆ) and PK∗ = (uwcu1 , . . . ,wch , uˆ, . . . , ˆh−τ ,Ω) from
PKPKS. Next, it initializes a certification list CL as an empty one and gives PP and PK∗ to A. A may
adaptively requests certification queries or sequential aggregate signature queries. If A requests the certifi-
cation of a public key by providing a public key PKi = (uiw
cu,i
1 , . . . ,Ωi) and its private key SKi = (αi,xi,yi),
then B checks the private key and adds the key pair (PKi,SKi) to CL. If A requests a sequential aggre-
gate signature by providing an aggregate-so-far AS′ on messages M′ = (M1, . . . ,Ml−1) under public keys
PK′ = (PK1, . . . ,PKl−1), and a message M to sign under the challenge private key of PK∗, then B proceeds
the aggregate signature query as follows:
1. It first checks that the signature AS′ is valid and that each public key in PK′ exits in CL.
2. It queries its signing oracle that simulates PKS2.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key
PK∗ and obtains a signature σ .
3. For each 1≤ i≤ l−1, it constructs an aggregate signature on message Mi using SAS2.AggSign since
it knows the private key that corresponds to PKi. The result signature is an aggregate signature for
messages M′||M under public keys PK′||PK∗ since this scheme does not check the order of aggrega-
tion. It gives the result signature AS to A.
Finally, A outputs a forged aggregate signature AS∗ = (S∗1,1, . . . ,S∗2,3) on messages M∗ = (M1, . . . ,Ml) under
public keys PK∗ = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK1 = PK∗. B
proceeds as follows:
1. B first checks the validity of AS∗ by using SAS2.AggVerify. Additionally, the forged signature should
not be trivial: the challenge public key PK∗ must be in PK∗, and the message M1 must not be queried
by A to the signature query oracle.
2. For each 2 ≤ i ≤ l, it parses PKi = (uiw
cu,i
1 , . . . ,Ωi) from PK
∗
, and it retrieves the private key SKi =
(αi,xi,yi) of PKi from CL. It then computes
W1,1 = S∗1,1
l
∏
i=2
(
gα j(S∗2,1)xiMi+yi
)−1
, W1,2 = S∗1,2
l
∏
i=2
(
(S∗2,2)xiMi+yi
)−1
, W1,3 = S∗1,3
l
∏
i=2
(
(S∗2,3)xiMi+yi
)−1
,
W2,1 = S∗2,1, W2,2 = S∗2,2, W2,3 = S∗2,3.
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3. It outputs σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,3) as a non-trivial forgery of the PKS scheme since it did not make a
signing query on M1.
The public parameters and the public key are correctly distributed, and the sequential aggregate signa-
tures are also correctly distributed since this scheme does not check the order of aggregation. The result
signature σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,3) of the simulator is a valid PKS signature on the message M1 under the public
key PK∗ since it satisfies the following equation:
3
∏
i=1
e(W1,i,V1,i) ·
3
∏
i=1
e(W2,i,V2,i)−1
= e(S∗1,1, gˆt) · e(S∗1,2, gˆνt) · e(S∗1,4, gˆ−τt) · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1·
e(S∗2,1,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)νt)−1 · e(S∗2,3,
l
∏
i=2
(uˆMii
ˆhi)−τt)−1·
e(S∗2,1,(uˆM1 ˆh)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,(uˆM1 ˆh)νt)−1 · e(S∗2,3,(uˆM1 ˆh)−τt)−1
= e(S∗1,1,C1,1) · e(S∗1,2,C1,2) · e(S∗1,3,C1,3) · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1·
e(S∗2,1,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)t)−1 · e(S∗2,2,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)νt)−1 · e(S∗2,3,
l
∏
i=1
(uˆMii
ˆhi)−τt)−1
=
3
∏
i=1
e(S∗1,i,C1,i) ·
3
∏
i=1
e(S∗2,i,C2,i)−1 · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆt)−1 =
l
∏
i=1
Ωti ·
l
∏
i=2
Ω−ti = Ω
t
1
where δi = xiMi + yi and s˜2 = ∑li=2(xiMi + yi)s1 + s2. This completes our proof.
4.4 Discussions
Multiple Messages. The SAS schemes of this paper only allow a signer to sign once in the aggregate
algorithm. To support multiple signing per one signer, we can use the method of Lu et al. [27]. The basic
idea of Lu et al. is to apply a collision resistant hash function H to a message M before performing the
signing algorithm. If a signer wants to add a signature on a message M2 into the aggregate signature, he first
removes his previous signature on H(M1) from the aggregate signature using his private key, and then he
adds the new signature on the H(M1||M2) to the aggregate signature.
5 Multi-Signature
In this section, we propose an efficient multi-signature (MS) scheme with short public parameters and prove
its security without random oracles.
5.1 Definitions
Multi-Signature (MS) can be regarded as a special kind of PKAS in which different signatures generated
by different signers on the same message are combined as a short multi-signature. Thus MS consists of
four algorithms of PKS and additional two algorithms Combine and MultiVerify for combining a multi-
signature and verifying a multi-signature. In MS, each signer generates a public key and a private key, and
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he can generate an individual signature on a message by using his private key. To generate a multi-signature,
anyone can combine individual signatures of different signers on the same message. A verifier can check
the validity of the multi-signature by using the public keys of signers. An MS scheme is formally defined as
follows:
Definition 5.1 (Multi-Signature). A multi-signature (MS) scheme consists of six PPT algorithms Setup,
KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Combine, and MultVerify, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ , and outputs public parameters PP.
KeyGen(PP): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, and outputs a public
key PK and a private key SK.
Sign(M,SK): The signing algorithm takes as input a message M, and a private key SK. It outputs a
signature σ .
Verify(σ ,M,PK): The verification algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M under a public
key PK, and outputs either 1 or 0 depending on the validity of the signature.
Combine(σ ,M,PK): The combining algorithm takes as input signatures σ on a message M under public
keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl), and outputs a multi-signature MS.
MultVerify(MS,M,PK): The multi-verification algorithm takes as input a multi-signature MS on a mes-
sage M under public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl), and outputs either 1 or 0 depending on the validity
of the multi-signature.
The correctness requirement is that for each PP output by Setup(1λ ), for all (PK,SK) output by KeyGen(PP),
and any M, we have that Verify(Sign(M,SK),M,PK) = 1 and for each σ on message M under public keys
PK, MultVerify(Combine(σ ,M,PK),M,PK) = 1.
The security model of MS was defined by Micali et al. [30], but we follow the security model of
Boldyreva [6] that requires for an adversary to register the key-pairs of other signers except the target signer,
namely the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) setting or the proof of knowledge (POK) setting. In this secu-
rity model, an adversary is first given the public key of a target signer. After that, the adversary adaptively
requests the certification of a public key by registering the key-pair of other signer, and he adaptively re-
quests a signature for the target signer on a message. Finally, the adversary outputs a forged multi-signature
on a message M∗ under public keys. If the forged multi-signature satisfies the conditions of the security
model, then the adversary wins the security game. The security model of MS is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Security). The security notion of existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack
is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C first initialize the certification list CL as empty. Next, it runs Setup to obtain public parame-
ters PP and KeyGen to obtain a key pair (PK,SK), and gives PP,PK to A.
2. Certification Query: A adaptively requests the certification of a public key by providing a key pair
(PK,SK). C adds the key pair (PK,SK) to CL if the private key is a valid one.
3. Signature Query: A adaptively requests a signature by providing a message M to sign under the
challenge public key PK, and receives a signature σ .
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4. Output: Finally, A outputs a forged multi-signature MS∗ on a message M∗ under public keys PK∗.
C outputs 1 if the forged signature satisfies the following three conditions, or outputs 0 otherwise: 1)
MultVerify(MS∗,M∗,PK∗) = 1, 2) The challenge public key PK must exists in PK∗ and each public
key in PK∗ except the challenge public key must be in CL, and 3) The message M∗ must not have been
queried by A to the signing oracle.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvMSA = Pr[C = 1] where the probability is taken over all the randomness
of the experiment. An MS scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if all PPT
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above experiment.
5.2 Construction
To construct an MS scheme with short public parameters, we may use our PKS schemes that support multi-
users and public re-randomization. To aggregate the randomness of signatures, we cannot use the technique
of Lu et al. [27] since the randomness should be freely aggregated in MS. Instead we aggregate the ran-
domness of signatures by using the fact that each signer generates a signature on the same message in MS.
That is, if group elements u,h that are related to message hashing are shared among all signers, then the
randomness of each signer can be easily aggregated since the random exponent in a public key and the ran-
domness of a signature are placed in different positions. Thus our two PKS schemes can be used to build
MS schemes since g,u,h in PKS1 or gwcg1 ,uw
cu
1 ,hw
ch
1 in PKS2 are published in a public key. Note that it is
not required for a signer to publicly re-randomize a multi-signature since each signer selects an independent
random value.
To reduce the size of multi-signatures, we use our PKS2 scheme for this MS scheme. Our MS scheme
based on the PKS2 scheme is described as follows:
MS.Setup(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈ G and gˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it selects random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + νφ2, w1 = wφ1,w2 = wφ2 . It selects random exponents x,y ∈ Zn and
computes u = gx,h = gy, uˆ = gˆx, ˆh = gˆy. It publishes public parameters by selecting random values
cg,cu,ch ∈ Zp as
PP =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), gw
cg
1 ,w
cg
2 ,w
cg , uwcu1 ,w
cu
2 ,w
cu , hwch1 ,w
ch
2 ,w
ch ,
w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ , uˆ, uˆν , uˆ−τ , ˆh, ˆhν , ˆh−τ , Λ = e(g, gˆ)
)
.
MS.KeyGen(PP): This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP. It selects a random exponent
α ∈ Zp and computes Ω = Λα . Then it outputs a private key SK = α and a public key as PK = Ω.
MS.Sign(M,SK): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ Zp and a private key SK = α . It selects
random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp and outputs a signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 = (gw
cg
1 )
α((uwcu1 )
M(hwch1 ))
rw
c1
1 ,
W1,2 = (w
cg
2 )
α((wcu2 )
Mw
ch
2 )
rw
c1
2 , W1,3 = (w
cg)α((wcu)Mwch)rwc1 ,
W2,1 = (gw
cg
1 )
rwc21 , W2,2 = (w
cg
2 )
rwc22 , W2,3 = (w
cg)rwc2
)
.
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MS.Verify(σ ,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M under a public key PK.
It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes verification components as
V1,1 = gˆt ,V1,2 = (gˆν)t ,V1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t ,
V2,1 = (uˆM ˆh)t ,V2,2 = ((uˆν )M ˆhν)t ,V2,3 = ((uˆ−τ )M ˆh−τ)t .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
MS.Combine(σ ,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input signatures σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) on a message M under
public keys PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) where PKi = Ωi. It first checks the validity of each signature σi =
(W i1,1, . . . ,W i2,3) by calling MS.Verify(σi,M,PKi). If any signature is invalid, then it halts. It then
outputs a multi-signature for a message M as
MS =
(
S1,1 =
l
∏
i=1
W i1,1, S1,2 =
l
∏
i=1
W i1,2, S1,3 =
l
∏
i=1
W i1,3,
S2,1 =
l
∏
i=1
W i2,1, S2,2 =
l
∏
i=1
W i2,2, S2,3 =
l
∏
i=1
W i2,3
)
.
MS.MultVerify(MS,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a multi-signature MS on a message M under
public keys PK= (PK1, . . . ,PKl) where PKi =Ωi. It chooses a random exponent t ∈Zp and computes
verification components as
V1,1 = gˆt ,V1,2 = (gˆν)t ,V1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t ,
V2,1 = (uˆM ˆh)t ,V2,2 = ((uˆν )M ˆhν)t ,V2,3 = ((uˆ−τ )M ˆh−τ)t .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(S1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(S2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= ∏li=1 Ωti. If this equation holds, then it
outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
5.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 5.3. The above MS scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the PKS2
scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack. That is, for any PPT adversary A for the
above MS scheme, there exists a PPT algorithm B for the PKS2 scheme such that AdvMSA (λ )≤ AdvPKSB (λ ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that forges the above MS scheme with a non-negligible advan-
tage ε . A simulator B that forges the PKS2 scheme is given: a challenge public key PKPKS =((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),
gwcg1 , . . . ,Λ,Ω). ThenB that interacts withA is described as follows: B first constructs PP=((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),
gwcg1 , . . . ,Λ) by computing Λ= e(gw
cg
1 , gˆ) ·e(w
cg
2 , gˆ
ν) ·e(wcg , gˆ−τ) = e(g, gˆ) and PK∗=Ω from PKPKS. Next,
it initialize a certification list CL as an empty one and gives PP and PK∗ to A. A may adaptively request
certification queries or signature queries. If A requests the certification of a public key by providing a public
key PKi = Ωi and its private key SKi = αi, then B checks the key pair and adds (PKi,SKi) to CL. If A re-
quests a signature by providing a message M to sign under the challenge private key of PK∗, then B queries
its signing oracle that simulates PKS2.Sign on the message M for the challenge public key PK∗, and gives
the signature toA. Finally, A outputs a forged multi-signature MS∗= (S∗1,1, . . . ,S∗2,3) on a message M∗ under
public keys PK∗ = (PK1, . . . ,PKl) for some l. Without loss of generality, we assume that PK1 = PK∗. B
proceeds as follows:
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1. B first check the validity of MS∗ by calling MS.MultVerify. Additionally, the forged signature should
not be trivial: the challenge public key PK∗ must be in PK∗, and the message M must not be queried
by A to the signing oracle.
2. For each 2≤ i≤ l, it parses PKi = Ωi from PK∗, and it retrieves the private key SKi = gαi of PKi from
CL. It then computes
W1,1 = S∗1,1 ·
l
∏
i=2
(
gαi
)−1
, W1,2 = S∗1,2, W1,3 = S∗1,3,
W2,1 = S∗2,1, W2,2 = S∗2,2, W2,3 = S∗2,3.
3. It outputs σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,3) as a non-trivial forgery of the PKS scheme since it did not make a
signing query on M1.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. It is obvious that the
public parameters, the public key, and the signatures are correctly distributed. Next we show that the output
signature σ = (W1,1, . . . ,W2,3) of the simulator is a valid signature for the PKS2 scheme on the message M1
under the public key PK∗ since it satisfies the following equation
3
∏
i=1
e(W1,i,V1,i) ·
3
∏
i=1
e(W2,i,V2,i)−1
=
3
∏
i=1
e(S∗1,i,V1,i) ·
3
∏
i=1
e(S∗2,i,V2,i)−1 · e(
l
∏
i=2
gαi , gˆ)−1 =
l
∏
i=1
Ωti ·
l
∏
i=2
Ω−ti = Ω
t
1.
This completes our proof.
5.4 Discussions
Removing the Proof of Knowledge. In our MS scheme, an adversary should prove that he knows the
private key of other signer by using a zero-knowledge proof system. Ristenpart and Yilek [32] showed that
some MS schemes can be proven in the proof of possession (POP) setting instead of the POK setting. Our
MS scheme also can be proven in the POP setting by using their technique. That is, if our MS scheme is
incorporated with a POP scheme that uses a different hash function, and the adversary submits a signature
on the private key of other signer as the proof of possession, then the security of our scheme is also achieved.
In the security proof, a simulator cannot extract the private key element gα from the signature of the POP
scheme, but he can extract other values gα wc′1 ,wc
′
2 ,w
c′ and these values are enough for the security proof.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we first proposed two PKS schemes with short public keys that support multi-users and public
re-randomization based on the LW-IBE scheme. Next, we proposed two SAS schemes with short public
keys without random oracles and with no relaxation of assumptions (i.e., employing neither random oracles
nor interactive assumptions) based on our two PKS schemes. The proposed SAS schemes are the first of
this kind that have short (a constant number of group elements) size public keys and a constant number of
pairing operations per message in the verification algorithm. We also proposed an MS scheme with short
public parameters based on our PKS scheme and proved its security without random oracles.
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There are many interesting open problems. The first one is to construct an SAS scheme with short
public keys that is secure under standard assumptions without random oracles. A possible approach is to
build an SAS scheme based on the practical PKS scheme of Bo¨hl et al. [5] that is secure under the standard
assumption. The second one is to build an SAS scheme with short public keys that supports lazy verification
and has the constant size of aggregate signatures. Brogle et al. [12] proposed an SAS scheme with lazy
verification, but the size of aggregate signatures in their SAS scheme is not constant.
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A Lewko-Waters IBE
In this section, we describe the IBE scheme of Lewko and Waters (LW-IBE) [26] in prime order bilinear
groups and the PKS scheme (LW-PKS) that is derived from the LW-IBE scheme.
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A.1 The LW-IBE Scheme
The LW-IBE scheme in prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
IBE.Setup(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g ∈ G and gˆ, wˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it chooses random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + νφ2. It selects random exponents α ,x,y ∈ Zp and sets u = gx, uˆ =
gˆx,h = gy, ˆh = gˆy, wˆ1 = wˆφ1, wˆ2 = wˆφ2 . It outputs a master key MK = (α , gˆ, uˆ, ˆh, wˆ1, wˆ2, wˆ) and public
parameters as
PP =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), g,gν ,g−τ , u,uν ,u−τ , h,hν ,h−τ , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
IBE.GenKey(ID,MK): This algorithm takes as input an identity ID ∈ {0,1}k where k < λ and the master
key MK. It selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp and outputs a private key as
SKID =
(
K1,1 = gˆα(uˆID ˆh)rwˆc11 ,K1,2 = wˆ
c1
2 ,K1,3 = wˆ
c1 , K2,1 = gˆrwˆc21 ,K2,2 = wˆ
c2
2 ,K2,3 = wˆ
c2
)
.
IBE.Encrypt(M, ID,PP): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈GT , an identity ID, and the public
parameters PP. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C = e(g, gˆ)αtM, C1,1 = gt ,C1,2 = (gν)t ,C1,3 = (g−τ)t ,
C2,1 = (uIDh)t ,C2,2 = ((uν)IDhν)t ,C2,3 = ((u−τ)IDh−τ)t
)
.
IBE.Decrypt(CT,SKID,PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT , a private key SKID, and the
public parameters PP. If the identities of the ciphertext and the private key are equal, then it computes
M =C ·
3
∏
i=1
e(C1,i,K1,i)−1 ·
3
∏
i=1
e(C2,i,K2,i).
A.2 The LW-PKS Scheme
To derive a LW-PKS scheme from the LW-IBE scheme, we apply the transformation of Naor [9]. Addition-
ally, we represent the signature in G instead of ˆG to reduce the size of signatures. The LW-PKS scheme in
prime order bilinear groups is described as follows:
PKS.KeyGen(1λ ): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,w ∈ G and gˆ ∈ ˆG. Next, it chooses random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + νφ2. It selects random exponents α ,x,y ∈ Zp and sets u = gx, uˆ =
gˆx,h = gy, ˆh = gˆy,w1 = wφ1,w2 = wφ2 . It outputs a private key SK = (α ,g,u,h) and a public key as
PK =
(
(p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), w1,w2,w, gˆ, gˆν , gˆ−τ , uˆ, uˆν , uˆ−τ , ˆh, ˆhν , ˆh−τ , Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
PKS.Sign(M,SK): This algorithm takes as input a message M ∈ {0,1}k where k < λ and a private key SK.
It selects random exponents r,c1,c2 ∈ Zp and outputs a signature as
σ =
(
W1,1 = gα (uMh)rwc11 ,W1,2 = w
c1
2 ,W1,3 = w
c1 , W2,1 = grwc21 ,W2,2 = w
c2
2 ,W2,3 = w
c2
)
.
38
PKS.Verify(σ ,M,PK): This algorithm takes as input a signature σ on a message M ∈ {0,1}k under a public
key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes verification components as
V1,1 = gˆt ,V1,2 = (gˆν)t ,V1,3 = (gˆ−τ)t ,
V2,1 = (uˆM ˆh)t ,V2,2 = ((uˆν )M ˆhν)t ,V2,3 = ((uˆ−τ )M ˆh−τ)t .
Next, it verifies that ∏3i=1 e(W1,i,V1,i) ·∏3i=1 e(W2,i,V2,i)−1 ?= Ωt . If this equation holds, then it outputs
1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We can safely move the elements w1,w2,w from the private key to the public key since these elements
are always constructed in the security proof of the LW-IBE scheme. However, this LW-PKS scheme does
not support multi-user setting and public re-randomization since the elements g,u,h are not given in the
public key.
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